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—  Comment  — 
What Is and What Should Never 
Be: Examining the Artificial 
Circuit “Split” on Citizens 
Recording Official Police Action 
“Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a 
man’s character, give him power.” *  
Abstract 
The free flow of information concerning public officials’ 
performance of their duties, widely disseminated to the citizenry, is 
important to the proper functioning of a democratic republic. Courts 
have traditionally recognized the important role of robust citizen 
oversight in maintaining public official accountability in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. As new media for recording and 
distributing information have arisen, the First Amendment’s 
protective embrace has consistently shielded users from criminal 
punishment for their communicative activity, regardless of the 
controversial nature of their subject matter. The propagation of 
smartphones with ever-greater audiovisual capabilities represents 
simply the latest phase in the evolution of electronic media, but some 
wary police and overzealous prosecutors have attempted to suppress 
citizens’ recording of public police activity using state wiretapping 
laws. Wiretapping statutes typically ensure this privacy by requiring 
the consent of one or all of the participants to a conversation, but for 
the consent requirement to attach as a preliminary matter, such a 
conversation must typically be private in a Fourth Amendment sense. 
The typical arrest scenario, performed by public officers in a public 
place, seemingly fails to fulfill this requirement. Accordingly, it is 
highly dubious whether such criminal statutes could ever be 
considered reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on First 
Amendment activity. With what appears to be a relatively 
straightforward constitutional analysis, doctrinal resolution on the  
* Attributed to Abraham Lincoln, but one source states it is actually a 
quote about Lincoln by an author, so it is probably apocryphal. 
Robert G. Ingersoll, True Greatness Exemplified in Abraham Lincoln, 
Unity, Mar. 1, 1883, no.1. At least one other source has attributed a 
similar quote to Lincoln: “If you want to discover just what there is in a 
man—give him power.” FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER, PORTRAIT LIFE 
OF LINCOLN: LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GREATEST AMERICAN 
34 (1910). 
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issue of citizen recording should have been fairly swift in the  
federal courts.  
 Yet the opposite has proven true. Several district courts’ 
applications of the discretion the Supreme Court granted them in 
Pearson v. Callahan—to decide whether a constitutional right is “clearly 
established” before addressing the substantive constitutional issues in 
§ 1983 cases—have stagnated the development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in this area. This Comment explores why the “sound 
discretion” granted by the Pearson Court may not be as broad as some 
district courts have assumed. Because the Pearson Court listed at some 
length what district courts should consider in utilizing their § 1983 
discretion—and Camreta v. Greene established that those considerations 
were factors, not merely dicta to be disregarded—the “sound discretion” 
of Pearson is not equivalent to carte blanche. Therefore, this Comment 
proposes that the Court can and should ensure adherence to its § 1983 
qualified immunity precedent by requiring district courts to make 
Pearson findings on the record. This would better facilitate adequate 
development of constitutional law on important contemporary issues like 
the First Amendment right to record police, ensuring that the district 
courts’ administrative convenience is curtailed enough to avoid  
doctrinal stagnation. 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................. 1899 
I.  Citizen Oversight as a Check on Police Power .................... 1901 
A.  Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? The First Amendment Case for 
Transparent Police Oversight .......................................................... 1902 
B.  Theory in Action: A Historical Perspective ...................................... 1905 
II.  The Obstacles to Establishing a Constitutional Right to 
Film Police ............................................................................ 1911 
A.  The Dubious Applicability of Wiretapping Statutes and Other 
Existing Criminal Laws to Recording by Third-Party Observers ..... 1911 
B.  The Current State of the “Clearly Established” Requirement: Pay 
No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain .................................. 1916 
C.  Glik-ety Split: Those Who Decide and Those Who Abstain .............. 1919 
1.  Courts That Find a First Amendment Right to Record on the 
Constitutional Merits ................................................................. 1920 
2.  Courts That Decline to Examine a First Amendment Right to 
Record by Disposing of Cases on the “Clearly Established” 
Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis................................. 1926 
III.  Addressing the Obstacles: Anchoring the Core and 
Filling in the Blanks ............................................................ 1930 
A.  There’s Still Hope: Why the Pearson Problem Should Not Be 
Insurmountable ................................................................................ 1931 
1.  Reemphasizing District Court Consideration of the Pearson 
Factors by Requiring Findings on the Record ........................... 1934 
2.  The Majority of the Pearson Factors Actually Favor 
Consideration of the First Amendment Right to Record ........... 1941 
B.  About Those Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions . . . .................. 1948 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
What Is and What Should Never Be 
1899 
C.  The Need for Statutory Damage Provisions with Teeth .................... 1951 
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 1953 
Introduction 
Being hit over the head with a police baton is no picnic.1 Neither 
is being tased.2 In the decades since the Rodney King beating first 
threw excessive police force into the American limelight, groups such 
as the ACLU have worked hard to keep it there by encouraging 
citizens to record and report such misconduct.3 With the advent of 
cheap handheld recording devices and new public fora spurred by the 
digital revolution, alleged instances of police brutality are legion.4 
Yet few would argue that the use of force is always 
inappropriate.5 Policing is undeniably dangerous work, sometimes 
 
1. In September 2013, a video surfaced on YouTube of police repeatedly 
striking an unarmed, mentally ill man who resisted arrest. After the 
man was tased, police administered at least six baton blows, resulting in 
broken bones to his arms and legs and a large gash on his head. Richard 
Winton, Long Beach Police Video: Man’s Arm, Leg Broken, Lawyer 
Says, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/ 
06/local/la-me-ln-long-beach-police-arrest-video-20130906 (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2014). See also VIDEO: Man Beaten with Baton by Sacramento 
Police Officers Later Dies in Custody, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 25, 
2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/video-
man-beaten-baton-dies-article-1.1354655 (depicting a fatal encounter 
where another mentally ill man was restrained by one officer while another 
officer hit him ten times over the head with a metal baton). 
2. See Charles Rabin, Two Men Die After Being Targeted by Miami-Dade 
Police Tasers, Miami Herald, Feb. 28, 2014, (describing the deaths of 
two men as the result of being tasered in two unrelated domestic dispute 
calls).  
3. See Andrew Rosado Shaw, Note, Our Duty in Light of the Law’s 
Irrelevance: Police Brutality and Civilian Recordings, 20 Geo. J. on 
Poverty L. & Pol’y 161, 184–85 (2012) (describing CopWatch, “a 
network of individual organizations dedicated to monitoring the police,” and 
the ACLU’s phone app, Police Tape, which allows citizens to record 
video and audio of police encounters and send it directly to secure 
ACLU servers in the event that police attempt to seize the phone or 
delete its contents). Several grassroots blogs are also dedicated to 
educating the public about police monitoring. See PINAC: 
Photography is Not a Crime, http://photographyisnotacrime.com 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2014); RighttoRecord.org, http://www. 
righttorecord.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
4. See Shaw, supra note 3, at 171 (“[V]ideo[-]sharing websites like 
YouTube host tens of thousands of videos alleging police misconduct.”).  
5. See Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Alleged Masturbating Man in Salem Bar 
Arrested after Taser Proves Ineffective, Officials Say, Oregonlive 
(Dec. 23, 2013, 9:03 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2013/12/alleged_masturbating_man_in_sa.html 
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requiring split-second decisions to ensure the safety of officers and 
bystanders. Discerning the justified use of force from the unjustified is 
often a difficult business. Some commentators, mainly police advocacy 
groups and prosecutors, have attempted to extend these rationales to 
justify suppression and confiscation of footage depicting police  
in action.6  
This Comment will argue that public safety justifications are only 
vindicable in a narrow subset of police-conduct filming situations; 
courts have alluded to these reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions in passing.7 The remainder forms a baseline of First 
Amendment-protected activity warranting uniform judicial 
recognition. But as this Comment will demonstrate, achieving uniform 
recognition has proven surprisingly difficult because of the procedural 
posture of most cases—§ 1983 claims against individual officers for 
damages. Development of the law has been stymied by the effects of 
the qualified immunity doctrine, under which judges can decline to 
reach the underlying constitutional question and instead simply rule 
that the law is not clearly established. With the ever-increasing 
omnipresence and technological capabilities of personal recording 
devices, doctrinal clarification is in order. Part I of this Comment will 
explain the important role of citizen scrutiny over public official 
activity in a well-functioning republic, providing historical examples 
of the powerful effect violent imagery has had on the American people 
since the nation’s inception. Part II will then analyze the recent case 
law involving citizen recording. It will briefly touch upon the 
misguided struggle to apply extant statutory schemes to criminalize 
filming situations facilitated by technological innovation. Primarily, 
however, it will examine the underlying procedural issues, observing 
 
(detailing the bizarre escapades of a man high on crystal meth and the 
subsequent efforts of numerous police officers to subdue him). 
6. See, e.g., David Murphy, Comment, “V.I.P.” Videographer Intimidation 
Protection: How the Government Should Protect Citizens Who 
Videotape the Police, 43 Seton Hall L. Rev. 319, 328 (2013) 
(referencing an interview with the executive director of the Fraternal 
Order of Police in which he asserts that citizen recording has a “chilling 
effect on some officers who are now afraid to act for fear of 
retribution”). 
7. Compare Szymecki v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:08-cv-00142-HCM-TEM, at 
8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2008) (using time, place, and manner restrictions 
as evidence that the First Amendment right to record is not clearly 
established), and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (same), with Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 
(11th Cir. 2000) (implying that time, place, and manner restrictions are 
an exception to, and do not preclude, First Amendment protection), and 
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (same), and ACLU of 
Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605–08 (7th Cir. 2012) (implying such 
restrictions must be very narrowly tailored). 
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that the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine for § 1983 actions has 
greatly hindered resolution of an important constitutional question. It 
will ultimately posit that, in light of recent developments and other 
precedent, the circuit split concerning a First Amendment right to 
record police officers is unsustainable as a proper application of 
qualified immunity doctrine. Finally, assuming that constitutional 
protection should be afforded to the majority of situations involving 
citizen recording, Part III will assess the major obstacles to obtaining 
relief that need to be addressed before recording police activity can be 
considered a right with any teeth. 
I. Citizen Oversight as a Check on Police Power 
Sometimes it is easy to forget the critical role speech plays in 
greasing the wheels of our democracy. As we collapse on the sofa at 
the end of another grueling workday, perhaps we flip on the news and 
catch a few snippets about an opposition leader in some far-flung 
region of the globe who has been jailed because those in power disdain 
or feel threatened by his or her message.8 The alleged crimes are 
 
8. See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu & Dan Bilefsky, In Turkey, Twitter Roars After 
Effort to Block It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2014, at A6 (“While Turkey, a 
predominantly Muslim country of 79 million people, has long sought to 
portray itself as a model of democracy in a restive region, critics both 
inside and outside the country denounced the government’s ban as a 
‘digital coup’ more befitting China or North Korea.”); Olga Rudenko, 
Police Storm Ukraine Opposition Office, Comes in Wake of Anti-
Government Protest Sunday, USA Today, Dec. 10, 2013, at 7A 
(describing a police raid on the opposition party’s headquarters in 
Ukraine), Oleg Shynkarenko, Ukraine’s Bloody Crackdown Enters Its 
Third Day, Daily Beast (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www. 
thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/19/ukraine-s-bloody-crackdown-
enters-its-third-day.html (“More than 30 people have been killed and 
hundreds wounded in the latest bout of violence to engulf Ukraine. The 
authorities have called it an anti-terrorist operation, though of course 
none of those killed . . . was a real terrorist.”); Moises Naim, Venezuela 
on the Brink, Huffington Post (Feb. 28, 2014, last updated 5:59 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/moises-naim/venezuela-unrest_ 
b_4874523.html (describing popular frustration in Venezuela regarding 
the jailing of opposition leaders and the shutdown of television stations); 
Nancy A. Youssef, Egyptians Use Muslim Brotherhood Crackdown to 
Settle Scores, Miami Herald, Feb. 28, 2014, (explaining politically 
motivated arrests in Egypt, ostensibly for party affiliation); Stanley 
Weiss, What Thailand Needs Most Is a Bill of Rights, Huffington 
Post (Feb. 28, 2014, last updated 9:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stanley-weiss/what-thailand-needs-
most_b_4877124.html?utm_hp_ref=world&ir=WorldPost (alluding to 
Thailand’s vicious cycle of protests, coups, and government 
crackdowns); Reuters, Is Gen. Franco Still Dead?, The Chronicle, 
Nov. 30, 2013, at 2 (“Spain’s conservative government agreed Friday to 
toughen penalties for unauthorized street protests up to a possible 
$816,000 fine, a crackdown that belies the peaceful record of the anti-
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sometimes laughably dubious;9 we shake hour heads and change the 
channel, secure in the knowledge that the repression exercised by 
authoritarian regimes and fledgling democracies would not dare show 
its face in our own nation. Indeed, many of the mechanisms that 
accord us this sense of security operate so inconspicuously in the 
background of our constitutional fabric that perhaps most of us 
seldom take the time to stop and think about them. But this is not 
necessarily so. Legal thinkers in the Founding era carefully considered 
the ramifications of free speech, or lack thereof, to the problems of 
their day.10 As the decades passed, the problems changed, but the core 
principles remained the same. Interested citizens, commentators, and, 
most importantly, courts have adapted these timeless principles to 
contemporary media to ensure an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open”11 evaluation of our nation’s affairs. As previously inconceivable 
media make more information available to more people at faster rates 
than ever before, it is critical that courts continue their traditional 
role as guardians of this public discourse. 
A. Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? The First Amendment 
Case for Transparent Police Oversight 
One traditional principle that has shaped the present debate 
about citizen recording is embodied in the phrase “quis custodiet ipsos 
 
austerity protests of recent years.”). See also Trudy Rubin, Op-Ed, 
Squelching Dissenters Won’t Work, Newport News Daily Press, 
Mar. 1, 2014, at A16 (“From Russia, to Ukraine, to Venezuela, to 
Egypt, and beyond, there are copycats: Arrest opposition leaders on 
absurd charges, hold show trials, beat—or sometimes shoot—protesters, 
and silence media that challenge the government’s message. Then blame 
a foreign conspiracy. This formula kept many dictators in power in the 
20th century. It is outdated in this one.”). 
9. See, e.g., Alastair Gale, North Confirms It Has Purged Dictator’s Uncle, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at A10 (“North Korea confirms purge of 
leader Kim Jong Un’s uncle and country’s second-highest leader Jang 
Song Thaek because of anti-state crimes, including selling off natural 
resources, taking drugs and squandering foreign currency at casinos.”); 
Opposition Blasts Venezuela “Repression,” Nation’s Military to Deploy 
Troops into Restive Region, Tampa Tribune, Feb. 21, 2014, at 1 
(detailing the Venezuelan opposition leader’s arrest on charges of arson 
and criminal incitement as part of an “attempted coup sponsored by 
right-wing and ‘fascist’ opponents in Venezuela and abroad, particularly 
the United States”). 
10. See AKHIL REED AMAR, The Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction 20–26, 231–45 (1998); ROBERT J. WAGMAN, The 
First Amendment Book (1991). 
11. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[I]t may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”). 
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custodes.”12 Translated loosely, it asks, “Who will watch the 
watchmen?,” a question posed multiple times during the first wave of 
student-written works on cell-phone recording.13 Operating from the 
premise that unchecked police power is inherently undesirable, such 
pieces lauded “the role of police recordings in exposing police conduct 
to the public.”14  
From a big-picture standpoint, such exposure encourages citizens 
to evaluate and discuss whether the disputed police conduct evinced 
by the footage “is or is not abusive behavior.”15 If a consensus is 
reached that the behavior crossed the acceptable line of reasonable 
force, then system-wide policy changes can be made, resulting in 
“strengthen[ed] public confidence in police.”16 Without the 
transparency that police recording fosters,17 human nature and 
internal departmental pressures might result in information about 
questionable police interactions never seeing the light of day,18 
potentially increasing the amount of wrongful behavior as the 
accountability of officers decreases. 
Exposure of police conduct via video recording can also have a 
major impact in the courtroom.19 For a long time, commentators have 
noted that juries often exhibit a significant bias in favoring a police 
officer’s version of events over a criminal defendant’s.20 Video footage 
often goes a long way in narrowing or eliminating this built-in 
 
12. Juvenal: The Satires 6.346–348 (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford ed. 1991).  
13. See Michael Potere, Comment, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: 
Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 273 (2012); 
Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use 
of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 389 (2012); Robert J. Tomei Jr., Note, Watching the Watchmen: 
The People’s Attempt to Hold On-Duty Law Enforcement Officers 
Accountable for Misconduct and the Illinois Law That Stands in Their 
Way, 32 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 385 (2012); Marianne F. Kies, Policing the 
Police: Freedom of the Press, The Right to Privacy, and Civilian 
Recordings of Police Activity, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 274 (2011). 
14. Mark Brncik, Note, A Case for Non-Enforcement of Anti-Recording 
Laws Against Citizen Recorders, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 485, 503 
(2011). 
15. Id. at 502. 
16. Id. at 504. 
17. Id. at 518. 
18. Id. at 504–05 (explaining the “Blue Code of Silence” that permeates 
some police departments’ culture). 
19. Shaw, supra note 3, at 172. 
20. Id. (citing Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 Hastings 
L.J. 753, 764–66 (1993)). 
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credibility gap.21 Without it, civil actions for police brutality may 
often prove fruitless,22 and criminal defendants may be more likely to 
accept a plea bargain on terms more favorable than they would 
receive at trial in a “he said, she said”-type case.23 The courtroom 
impact is not always limited to the trial stage of a proceeding. In 
recent years, the importance of video evidence to supplement the 
factual record has reared its head at the summary judgment stage as 
well.24 If seeing is believing,25 it is not difficult to understand why 
many police are uncomfortable with the prospect of losing the 
inherent advantages the system afforded them prior to the advent of 
handheld recording devices. 
But history26 and the Bill of Rights counsel toward lifting the veil. 
Legal commentators have attempted to locate the right to record in a 
variety of places, including three of the six clauses of the First 
Amendment27 and the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and 
 
21. Id. at 162 (citing Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive 
Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers’ 
Power, 117 Yale L.J. 1549, 1152–54 (2008)). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 172 n.118 (citing Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and 
Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 Judicature 
180, 180–84 (Jan.-Feb. 2008)). See also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 
(2007) (holding that a court was not required to accept the non-moving 
party’s version of the facts at the summary judgment stage when 
undisputed video evidence clearly contradicts it); Brncik, supra note 14, 
at 505 (summarizing the importance of Scott v. Harris and a Ninth 
Circuit companion case on citizen recording). 
25. See Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the Best Disinfectant: The 
Case for a First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 51 Washburn 
L.J. 349, 349 (2012) (“To receive second-hand information, even from a 
trusted, reliable source, may still raise doubts about the authenticity of 
what has been reported. But to actually see something with our own 
eyes not only removes those lingering doubts but provides us with the 
joy, sadness, amazement, or outrage that can only come from seeing it 
for ourselves. Simply stated, images are compelling.”). 
26. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting several preeminent historical treatises that discuss the First 
Amendment right to gather information in order to hold government 
accountable). See also Travis Gunn, Note, Knowledge Is Power: The 
Fundamental Right to Record Present Observations in Public, 54 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1409, 1431–44 (2013) (discussing the historical legal 
treatment of mechanical recording media). 
27. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of 
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the 
Information Age, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 249 (2004) (arguing that the Speech 
and Press Clauses converge to protect the process of gathering 
information, because it leads to expression); Howard M. Wasserman, 
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Fourteenth Amendments.28 Conceivably, one could argue that this 
makes the right to record police a constitutional orphan, worthy of 
sympathy but without a home. Yet the lopsidedness of the available 
commentary probably indicates that the converse is true: perhaps the 
right to record police flows from all of these sources independently, 
and therefore is paramount enough to warrant redundant protection. 
For, as James Madison said, ““[T]here are more instances of the 
abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent 
encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden 
usurpations.”29 
B. Theory in Action: A Historical Perspective 
America has a long history of demanding social change when 
confronted with visceral imagery of official misconduct. One of its 
earliest examples serves as an apt parallel to today’s filming debate. 
In early March 1770, tensions were running high in Boston. Two 
regiments of British soldiers, sent by the Crown to enforce the wildly 
unpopular Townshend Acts, had allegedly been heavy-handed in their 
interactions with the locals.30   
Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 Md. 
L. Rev. 600, 658–59 (2009) (arguing that allowing citizens to film police 
catalyzes the ability to petition the government for the redress of grievances 
and that civil litigation against the government is itself a form of 
petitioning for redress of grievances); Murphy, supra note 6, at 324–25 
(demonstrating how the Speech, Press, and Petition clauses could all be 
invoked in a hypothetical police recording scenario). Conceivably, an 
argument could be made that a fourth First Amendment Clause right, the 
right to assemble, is at least indirectly implicated, because a free flow of 
information encourages people to organize and take action against 
government misconduct. Cf. Nicholas S. Brod, Note, Rethinking a 
Reinvigorated Right to Assemble, 63 Duke L.J. 155, 159 (2013) 
(advocating for a renewed emphasis on a “speech-assembly nexus” in 
constitutional thinking). 
28. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & John A. Steakley, Commentary, A Due 
Process Right to Record the Police, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1203, 1209 
(2012) (conceiving of the right to record police as a protected liberty 
interest, the “erroneous deprivation” of which constitutes a due process 
violation). 
29. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on the 
Control of the Military (June 16, 1788), in 1 The History of the 
Virginia Federal Convention of 1788, with Some Account by 
Eminent Virginians of That Era Who Were Members of That 
Body 130 (Hugh Blair Grigsby et al. eds., 1890). 
30. Robert J. Allison, New England Remembers: The Boston 
Massacre 1–7 (2006). See generally Armand Francis Lucier & 
Samuel Adams, Journal of Occurrences: Patriot Propaganda 
on the British Occupation of Boston (Heritage Books 1996) 
(cataloging the events of the day from a decidedly pro-colonist 
viewpoint). 
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Early one evening, a young barber’s apprentice spotted a redcoat 
whom he believed to be overdue in paying a bill to his master.31 When 
the apprentice called the soldier out on his alleged debt (which had 
actually been paid), another soldier, standing sentry in front of the 
Customs House, replied that the apprentice was out of line and should 
show the first soldier proper respect.32 The apprentice did not take 
kindly to the suggestion and a verbal spat ensued, culminating with 
the second soldier approaching the apprentice and striking him on the 
head with the butt of his musket.33 
All hell broke loose. As an increasingly unruly crowd surrounded 
the redcoats, a handful of reinforcements arrived with arms drawn.34 
“Snowballs, ice, and oyster shells rained down on the soldiers.”35 
When one of them hit a soldier with enough force to knock him to the 
ground, he responded instinctively by rising and firing his musket 
without orders.36 Others, panicking, followed suit. When the smoke 
cleared, eleven locals lay bleeding, with five eventually succumbing to 
their injuries.37  
The only way the colonial governor could quell the insurrection 
was to tepidly assure his citizenry of a thorough investigation.38 Both 
regiments of troops and all customs officers were removed from the 
city proper.39 On both sides of the Atlantic, people attempted to 
ascertain the true chain of events and proper assignation of 
culpability.40 In addition to written accounts, Paul Revere’s engraving 
of the shooting, printed in the Boston Gazette, greatly fueled the 
clamor for justice—and forever ingrained the Boston Massacre in the 
 
31. Allison, supra note 30, at 11. 
32. Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 185–86 (1970). 
33. Id. 
34. Allison, supra note 30, at 11–13. 
35. Id. at 13. British accounts often add stones to the list of projectiles that 
the crowd hurled at the soldiers. Hardly a Massacre—British View, THE 
BOSTON MASSACRE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.bostonmassacre.net 
/british.htm. 
36. Zobel, supra note 32, at 197; Allison, supra note 30, at 14. 
37. Allison, supra note 30, at 14. 
38. Id. at 20–21. 
39. Id. at 20. 
40. Competing pamphlets containing witness depositions from each side, 
Loyalist and Patriot, each claimed to provide the “fair” version of 
events. Compare James Bowdoin et al., A Short Narrative of 
the Horrible Massacre in Boston (John Doggett, Jr. ed., 1849) 
(Patriot account), with Thomas Hutchinson, A Fair Account of the 
Late Unhappy Disturbances in Boston (1770) (Loyalist account). 
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American psyche.41 Nine soldiers were indicted for murder by  
mid-March.42  
At trial in November, no less a man than Founder and future-
President John Adams represented the soldiers to assure a fair trial.43 
Putting on his advocacy hat, Adams in colorful language urged the 
jury to put aside their preconceived notions and focus instead on in-
court witness testimony, claiming self-defense: 
We have entertained a great variety of phrases to avoid calling 
this sort of people a mob. . . . The plain English is, gentlemen, 
[it was] most probably a motley rabble of saucy boys, Negroes 
and mulattoes, Irish teagues and outlandish jacktars. And why 
should we scruple to call such a people a mob, I can’t conceive, 
unless the name is too respectable for them.44  
Among the “mulattoes” comprising the “mob” was Crispus Attucks, a 
runaway slave working as a sailor who was the first victim to fall.45 
Adams sought to portray Attucks as a primary instigator who had 
exhibited “mad behavior” by striking a redcoat,46 despite some 
witnesses characterizing him as more of a relatively passive 
bystander.47 Apparently the narrative resonated, as six soldiers were 
acquitted and two were convicted of the lesser charge  
of manslaughter.48 
So if the outcome of the case was relatively unaffected by 
Revere’s lithograph and the competing press accounts, and the jury 
instead focused on the in-court testimony, what is the point? Does not 
this historical example actually illustrate the relative unimportance of 
powerful imagery in combatting official misconduct? Perhaps it does, 
if one takes a narrow, micro view of cause and effect. Obviously an 
 
41. Allison, supra note 30, at 26–29. The author points out that Revere 
likely plagiarized Henry Pelham, another prominent engraver. Id. at 27. 
See also Conor M. Reardon, Note, Cell Phones, Police Recording, and 
the Intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments, 63 Duke L.J. 
735, 740 (2013) (noting the public outcry arising in part from Revere’s 
work, which later made some question whether the British soldiers 
would receive a fair trial). 
42. Frederic Kidder, History of the Boston Massacre 123–25 (Joel 
Munsell ed., 1870) (providing a transcript of the soldiers’ trial and a 
copy of their indictments for murder). 
43. David McCullough, John Adams 66 (2001).  
44. Id. at 67. 
45. Allison, supra note 30, at 12, 14. 
46. Kidder, supra note 42, at 257–58. 
47. Id. at 6, 13, 16, 142, 164, 168. 
48. McCullough, supra note 43, at 68. 
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after-the-fact artist’s rendering of a controversial event is not 
competent in-court evidence.49 But the fact remains that thirteen 
years later there were no more redcoats in Boston.50 And this is the 
macro view of cause and effect: even when an image has no 
perceptible or permissible effect in any single legal proceeding, it can 
shape the broader public discourse as people engage in “the free 
discussion of government affairs.”51 Citizens use such images to spread 
messages to other citizens in the hopes of spurring collective action, 
thus allowing broader segments of society to simultaneously evaluate 
those messages and determine if government officers are truly acting 
in accordance with its best interests. 
To illustrate, fast-forward two hundred years to the tumultuous 
decades in the middle of the last century. Not only had actual still 
images52 displaced mere artists’ renderings, but moving images could 
also be recorded,53 placing the viewer at the scene in a way previously 
unimaginable. From the comfort of a movie theater, and eventually 
their own living rooms,54 millions of Americans could evaluate their 
nation’s foreign policy actions abroad, good or bad, with far greater 
context than ever before.55   
49. Although Revere did in fact render a detailed map of the fallen bodies’ 
final location for use as an exhibit at trial, the lithograph illustrating the 
Massacre was highly inflammatory and prejudiced. Allison, supra note 
30, at 15, 26–29; Zobel, supra note 32, at 268. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 403 
(“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury . . . .”). 
50. See Treaty of Paris, United States–Great Britain, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 
80, T.S. No. 104 (recognizing United States sovereignty). 
51. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).  
52. Louis Daguerre is credited with inventing the daguerreotype, an early 
forerunner to the modern camera, in 1837. Helmut Gernsheim, A 
Concise History of Photography 10–11 (3d ed. 1986).  
53. Not to be outdone by Daguerre, fellow Frenchman Louis Le Prince is 
credited with inventing the first motion picture camera in 1888. A 
Technological History of Motion Pictures and Television: An 
Anthology from the Pages of the Journal of the Society of 
Motion Picture and Television Engineers 76–84 (Raymond 
Fielding ed., 1967). 
54. The first television broadcasts in the United States were in 1928, 
although widespread adoption in American households did not occur 
until the late 1940s. WRNY to Start Daily Television Broadcasts; Radio 
Audience Will See Studio Artists, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1928, at 13; James 
L. Baughman, Television Comes to America, 1947–57, Ill. Hist., Mar. 
1993, at 41. 
55. Just as the graphic images of the Nazis’ mass executions reinforced the 
righteousness of American intervention in Europe during World War II, 
scenes like the My Lai massacre and self-immolation of Buddhist monks 
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Domestically, the consequences were even more powerful.56 The 
Civil Rights movement blossomed as people in all regions of the 
country were exposed to the realities of Southern segregation on the 
nightly news. When the police chief of Birmingham callously turned 
attack dogs and fire hoses on peaceful protesters, the footage “tore at 
America’s conscience.”57 No longer could official brutality hide in the 
shadows of regional parochialism; after a hundred years of suppressed, 
superficial freedom for a large segment of society, America suddenly 
demanded more. Civil rights shot to the top of the Kennedy 
administration’s agenda, culminating with passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.58 
When the long history of macro effects flowing from imagery of 
official misconduct is properly established, the real significance of the 
Rodney King beating59 comes into focus. By 1991, the technology 
required to film was no longer cost-prohibitive to the masses.60 
Handheld camcorders in the hands of everyday citizens meant that 
footage of official misconduct no longer had to pass through the 
 
initiated significant second-guessing. See Alan Taylor, In-Focus with 
Alan Taylor: World War II: The Holocaust, Atlantic (Oct. 16, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2011/10/world-war-ii-the-holocaust 
/100170/; Joseph Eszterhas, Cameraman Saw GIs Slay 100 Villagers, 
Plain Dealer, Nov. 20, 1969, at A1; Jonathan Sanger, Burning Monk 
Photo: How a Moment Became Breaking News in 15 Hours, NBC News 
(June 11, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://photoblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/ 
06/11/18886161-burning-monk-photo-how-a-moment-became-breaking-
news-in-15-hours?lite. 
56. Consider Lawrence Beitler’s iconic photograph of the lynching of two 
African American men in Marion, Indiana, which later inspired the song 
“Strange Fruit” by Billie Holiday. Jack Doyle, “Strange Fruit” 1939, 
PopHistoryDig.com (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.pophistorydig.com/ 
?tag=strange-fruit-protest-song (last visited Mar. 6, 2014); Strange 
Fruit: Anniversary of a Lynching, NPR Radio Diaries (Aug. 6, 2010, 
4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
129025516. 
57. Corky Siemaszko, Birmingham Erupted into Chaos in 1963 As Battle 
for Civil Rights Exploded in South, N.Y. Daily News (May 3, 2012, 
9:26 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/birmingham-
erupted-chaos-1963-battle-civil-rights-exploded-south-article-1.1071793. 
58. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
59. See Howard Rosenberg, Minicamwitness News—Welcome to the 
Revolution, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at F1 (“Welcome to America’s 
ugliest home videos . . . . Increasingly, no matter what happens or where 
it happens, an amateur with a minicam is there to record it, and 
subsequently TV is there to air it. In the case of the King incident, 
moreover, not only to air it but also, in repeatedly doing so, to indict 
symbolically Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates and his entire 
department.”). 
60. See infra note 141. 
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production process of mainstream reporting, which some 
commentators have argued had an acute sanitizing effect in prior 
decades.61 The unfiltered footage “turned what would otherwise have 
been a violent, but soon forgotten, encounter between Los Angeles 
police and Rodney King into one of the most widely watched and 
discussed incidents of its kind,”62 sparking both macro63 and micro64 
consequences. Thus, what the Rodney King beating really represents 
is the advent of personal accountability flowing from imagery of police 
misconduct. Video has finally provided a reliable enough medium to 
rival in-court testimony in terms of evidentiary value, and its 
proliferation and contribution to the public discourse on a macro and 
micro level should be fortified, not repressed. 
 
61. See generally Aniko Bodroghkozy, Equal Time: Television and 
the Civil Rights Movement (2012). 
62. The Holliday Videotape, U. Mo.-Kansas City L. Sch., 
http://law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/lapd/kingvideo.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2014) (containing links to video of the King beating). 
63. Unfortunately, fifty-three people died in the resulting L.A. Riots. 
Kathleen Miles, Rodney King L.A. Riots Told Through Shocking 
Videos, 20 Years Later, Huffington Post (last updated Apr. 29, 
2012, 12:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/24/rodney-
king-la-riots-videos_n_1401337.html. However, the systemic focus on 
police brutality has paid major dividends. Compare Ted Rohrlich, 
Majority Says Police Brutality Is Common, L.A. Times, Mar. 10, 1991, 
at A1 (indicating widespread public disagreement with the then-L.A. 
police chief’s assertion that the King beating was an “aberration”), with 
Joel Rubin et al., LAPD’s Change in Focus: The King Video Ushered 
Police into a YouTube World, L.A. Times. Mar. 3, 2011, at A1 
(“Compared to the cops who beat King, officers these days hit the streets 
with a new reality ingrained in their minds: Someone is always 
watching . . . . The ubiquitous use of cameras by the public has helped 
serve as a deterrent to police abuse, said Geoff Alpert, a leading expert on 
police misconduct.”). 
64. See Tracy Wood & Sheryl Stolberg, Beating Case Considered by Grand 
Jury, L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at B1 (reporting that law enforcement 
officials, including prosecutors and police, said that the officers who 
participated in the beating could face charges of assault with a deadly 
weapon, or assault “under color of authority”). All officers were 
acquitted of state charges, but two were later convicted of federal 
charges. Seth Mydans, Storm of Anger Erupts – National Guard is 
Called into City: Jury Acquits Los Angeles Policemen in Taped Beating, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1992, at A1; Seth Mydans, Tension Eases as 
Residents Hail the Verdict, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1993, at A1. King also 
won a civil suit for $3.8 million. Seth Mydans, Rodney King Is Awarded 
$3.8 Million: City to Pay Victim in ’91 Police Beating, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 20, 1994, at A14. 
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II. The Obstacles to Establishing a  
Constitutional Right to Film Police  
But enough history lessons. What have the federal courts said 
about a citizen’s right to film police? Nominally, a split has emerged, 
with three circuits recognizing a First Amendment right to record 
public officers and two declining.65 Yet this is not a split in the 
traditional sense; instead of actually answering the substantive 
constitutional question in the negative, the two holdouts have chosen 
not to even reach it.66 Rather, the judges in those circuits relied on a 
discretionary feature in § 1983’s qualified immunity doctrine to find 
such a right “not clearly established,” leaving the law in a state of 
unsettled stasis.67 To properly understand how this came to be, it is 
worth examining the existing criminal law under which police have 
argued authority to halt citizen filming. After demonstrating the 
questionable applicability of these laws as time, place, and manner 
restrictions on third-party video recording, this section will provide a 
brief synopsis of § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine, before taking a 
closer look at the key appellate court decisions that form the contours 
of the present legal landscape. 
A. The Dubious Applicability of Wiretapping Statutes and Other 
Existing Criminal Laws to Recording by Third-Party Observers 
The paradigm scenario for police interfering with citizen recording 
is as follows. Officer A arrests Citizen B on the street, pulls her over 
for a traffic offense, or detains her for some other brief period, such as 
a Terry stop.68 Citizen C, who may be either a total stranger or close 
acquaintance of B, but is not himself a suspect in any crime, observes 
the encounter and objects to some aspect of it. As a result, C takes 
out his smart phone and begins filming the officer’s actions. Officer A, 
or perhaps one of his colleagues, Officer D, notices the smart phone 
pointed in his direction and becomes agitated at being recorded. 
Officer D instructs C to stop filming Officer A and put the phone 
away. C declines. Officer D, now hot under the collar, again instructs 
 
65. Compare Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that there is a First Amendment right to film matters of public 
interest), and Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 
2000) (same), and Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82–84 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(same), and ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605–08 (7th Cir. 
2012) (same), with Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 
2009) (holding that a First Amendment right to record police is not 
clearly established), and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 
(3d Cir. 2010) (same). 
66. See Szymecki, 353 F. App’x at 853; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
67. See Szymecki, 353 F. App’x at 853; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
68. See infra note 303. 
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C to stow the phone. Again C refuses. Changing tack, Officer D asks 
C if his phone is recording audio as well as video. When C replies in 
the affirmative, Officer D snatches the phone and informs C he is 
under arrest. 
Sound far-fetched? In the two circuits declining to hold C’s right 
to record protected by the First Amendment, C could in fact be 
charged with a felony. Because C’s recording had an audio as well as 
a video component, C could potentially be guilty of violating a state 
wiretapping statute and face years in prison69 for his misconceived 
attempt at do-goodery.  
Modern state wiretapping statutes arose in the middle part of the 
last century as a response to calls to protect citizens’ reasonable 
expectations of private conversation from unwarranted intrusion by 
the government or unauthorized third parties.70 Essentially, these 
statutes make it a crime to surreptitiously record (and in some cases, 
eavesdrop on) private conversations without the participants’ consent. 
There are two major categories that then form based on the notion of 
consent. The so-called “one-party” consent statutes, where the person 
recording the conversation need only obtain the consent of a single 
participant, form the majority of state statutes as well as the federal 
baseline.71 A smaller number of states utilize the stricter “two-party” 
or “all-party” regimes, where the person recording the conversation 
must obtain the consent of every participant.72 Further variations 
concerning scienter73 and the secrecy or openness of the recording74 
exist, but the primary distinction in terms of legal relevance is 
precisely whose consent must be obtained before recording a 
conversation. 
 
69. Shaw, supra note 3, at 173 (referencing prison sentences in some states 
of over a decade). 
70. Howard J. Kaplan et al., ABA Sec. of Litig., The History and 
Law of Wiretapping 2–4 (2012); Michelle K. Wolf, Note, Anti-
Wiretapping Statutes: Disregarding Legislative Purpose and the 
Constitutional Pitfalls of Using Anti-Wiretapping Statutes to Prevent 
the Recording of On-Duty Police Officers, 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 
165, 167–72 (2012); Brncik, supra note 14. 
71. Brncik, supra note 14, at 489–90; Triano, supra note 13, at 391–94. 
72. Brncik, supra note 14, at 490–91; Triano, supra note 13, at 394–96. 
73. See Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Comment, Walking a Thin Blue Line: 
Balancing the Citizen’s Right to Record Police Officers Against Officer 
Privacy, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 183, 188 n.13 (2013) (referencing the all-
party consent statute rejected in ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, which required 
the offender to “knowingly and intentionally use[] an eavesdropping 
device”). 
74. Id. at 187 n.11 (attempting to reconcile these variations with Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test).  
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In an all-party-consent state, a person wishing to record police 
activity would first need to obtain the consent of the person being 
detained. In many cases where the detained citizen is likely to feel 
mistreated by the officer, the probability that such a citizen is likely 
to grant consent is not hard to conceive (although difficulties 
concerning exactly how to obtain that consent without obstructing 
the officer’s administration of justice75 lurk in the background). But it 
is similarly easy to conceive that, given the choice, most police officers 
would decline to grant such consent.76 In a scenario where several 
police officers are called upon to respond to the scene, the prospects of 
all-party consent are virtually nil. Thus, the formality and practical 
difficulty associated with obtaining consent of a private citizen, 
coupled with the high improbability of officer consent, make recording 
police encounters without violating anti-wiretapping statutes 
prohibitively difficult in all-party consent states. 
As might be imagined, the main evils with which these statutes 
historically concern themselves are the wiretapping of telephone lines 
and bugging of residences and other dwellings with hidden recording 
devices.77 Accordingly, commentators have largely excoriated the 
statutes’ application as time, place, and manner restrictions on the 
open filming of public officials performing their duties in  
public places.78 
First, the federal statute and many similar state statutes were 
enacted shortly after Katz v. United States79 and its emphasis on 
reasonable expectations of privacy.80 Some explicitly incorporated the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test into statutory language.81 
Opponents of the expansion of anti-wiretapping statutes to police  
75. See Potere, supra note 13, at 313 (“[A] videographer could potentially 
distract an officer, leading to an error that harms an investigation or 
results in injury.”). 
76. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 326–37 (analyzing “Incentives for Police 
Officers to Intimidate Videographers”). 
77. See Shaw, supra note 3, at 174 (comparing the dictionary definition of 
wiretapping to 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)). See also Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427, 467 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Electronic 
eavesdropping by means of concealed microphones and recording devices 
of various kinds has become as large a problem as wiretapping, and is 
pervasively employed by private detectives, police, labor spies, employers 
and others for a variety of purposes, some downright disreputable.”). 
78. See supra notes 14, 15, 28. 
79. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
80. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Wolf, supra note 70, at 
170–72 (explaining the domino effect Katz had on federal and state 
wiretapping legislation). 
81. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-62(2)(B) (2012); accord 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(2), (21)(A) (2012). 
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filming point out that there can be “no reasonable expectation that 
that conversation was private because the arrest [or other police 
encounter] was on a public street, within the presence of third parties, 
and within earshot of passersby.”82 Without a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, so the argument goes, the interactions between police 
officer and citizen does not fall within the subset of conversations the 
statute was implemented to protect.83 
A second argument made by opponents is that even if anti-
wiretapping laws are invoked, more important First Amendment 
interests outweigh them.84 While anti-wiretapping laws are arguably 
derived from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and its accompanying 
rationales,85 the fact remains that they are strictly statutory. As such, 
they must fall to superior constitutional commands, lest the right to 
report on public officers’ performance of their official duties be 
infringed upon and removed from the public discourse.86 A subset of 
this argument is that citizens forfeit their privacy rights when they 
assume the mantle of public office and are acting under color of that 
position.87 The dichotomy would then entail that whatever 
conversation police officers participated in while acting in their 
private capacity as citizens would be protected, while the privacy of 
those that took place while they were wearing the badge would have 
to give way to “an expectation of public accountability in the scope of 
their duties.”88  
82. Van Tassell, supra note 73 (referencing State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992)).  
83. E.g., Brncik, supra note 14, at 493–97. 
84. See, e.g., Justin Welply, Comment, When, Where and Why the First 
Amendment Protects the Right to Record Police Communications: A 
Substantial Interference Guideline for Determining the Scope of the 
Right to Record and For Revamping Restrictive State Wiretapping 
Laws, 57 St. Louis U. L.J. 1085, 1106 (2013) (proposing, instead of 
officer privacy, a “substantial interference” test for assessing the 
reasonableness of time, place, and manner restrictions on First 
Amendment protection for police recording); Jake Tracer, Public 
Officials, Public Duties, Public Fora: Crafting an Exception to the All-
Party Consent Requirement, 68 N.Y.U Ann. Surv. Am. L. 125, 151–63 
(2012) (proposing a legislative amendment to all-party consent statutes 
to take into account overriding First Amendment interests); Triano, 
supra note 13, at 410 (“[A]ny diminished privacy interests of police must 
‘give way’ when balanced against the First Amendment interests in 
recording and publishing matters of public importance, especially when 
seeking to uncover police misconduct—as balancing becomes futile when one 
side of the scale is empty.”). 
85. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
87. Triano, supra note 13, at 410–11. 
88. Id. at 410 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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The third major criticism of the anti-wiretapping statutes’ 
application is the asymmetry with which they have been applied.89 In 
many places around the country, dashboard cams have become 
increasingly prevalent in police cruisers, with little or no protest as to 
their propriety.90 In some state statutes, such dash-cams are 
specifically exempted from the operation of the statute.91 The result is 
a disproportionate concern for officer privacy over citizen privacy, 
rendering the underlying privacy justifications watery thin by “the 
turning of the Acts on their heads—police officers would be able to 
record civilians at all times (even in situations when officer safety is 
not a concern) regardless of privacy expectations, where civilians 
would not be able to record the police officers in the same 
circumstance.”92 
While all three major arguments against misuse of anti-
wiretapping statutes as time, place, and manner restrictions are 
compelling, the reasonable expectation of privacy and asymmetry 
rationales could also potentially be used by a court to resolve the 
issue of the legality of recording police on narrow statutory 
interpretation grounds. But only an argument with a First 
Amendment component can truly carry the day with regard to citizen 
filming. Purely statutory state-law arguments will have the 
disadvantage of being decided in a far more piecemeal manner,93 but 
more importantly, they will leave open other “catchall” offenses as 
means to suppress citizens’ filming of police work.94 Broad crimes like 
obstruction of justice, disorderly conduct, harassment, loitering, and 
trespassing will become the new preferred tools for police who wish to 
shield themselves from being filmed.95 The right to record must find 
 
89. Id. at 412–13. 
90. See Lee Williams, Should All Officers Have Cameras in Patrol Cars?, 
Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Aug. 31, 2012, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20120831/ARTICLE/120839914 
(“Police officials say they believe that the benefits that the video camera 
provides to officers, the department and the public, far outweigh the 
costs.”); Potere, supra note 13, at 313–14; Brncik, supra note 14, at 508. 
91. Triano, supra note 13, at 412 (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/14-
3(h) (2012)). 
92. Id. at 413. 
93. This will also likely deprive them of redressability through any federal 
cause of action. See infra Part II.C.2. 
94. Shaw, supra note 3, at 178. 
95. Id.; Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First 
Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 335, 362–64, 371 n.122 (2011) (describing how a person 
recording a police officer might be charged with loitering); Id. at 386 
n.179 (explaining how recording a police officer can be trespassing). 
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its home in the First Amendment, or forever be a vagabond subject to 
the whims of the laws of the respective states.  
B. The Current State of the “Clearly Established” Requirement:  
Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain 
Sometimes before proceeding to the underlying question of 
whether the Constitution confers a specific right, one must ask how 
he or she would vindicate that right in the event that a government 
official violated it. For violations like those mentioned in the 
paradigm scenario above, the most obvious post hoc remedy is a 
§ 1983 civil rights action against the offending official.96 Suits against 
individual officials ensure that they are held accountable for 
transgressing on others’ rights in the exercise of discretionary 
functions, something that neither forward-looking injunctions97 nor 
suits to establish municipal liability98—other forms of § 1983 relief—
can provide.  
A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 constitutional claim against an 
individual officer must allege facts showing that the officer acted 
under color of state law in depriving him or her of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights.99 If a defendant then asserts that he or she acted 
reasonably, within the confines of the law, a separate qualified 
immunity analysis is required.100 Qualified immunity is a judicial 
doctrine designed to exercise fairness to the public-official defendant. 
In the citizen-recording context, this means recognizing that police 
officers are neither lawyers nor judges and should not be held 
personally responsible for exercising reasonable discretion in enforcing 
the gray, unsettled fringes of the law.101 When a public official raises a 
 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Cf. Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the 
Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1242 (1979) 
(recounting the historical development of civil rights actions for 
damages). 
97. See Geoffrey J. Derrick, Qualified Immunity and the First Amendment 
Right to Record Police, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 243, 276–81 (2013) 
(explaining the difficulties with an individual obtaining injunctive relief 
in a First Amendment recording context). In any event, injunctive relief 
merely ensures that the government will not interfere with future 
constitutionally protected courses of action; they do not redress past 
wrongs. 
98. Id. at 281–282 (exploring the practical difficulties of proving Monell 
liability against municipalities). Even if Monell liability can be 
established, the individual officer who committed the wrong may receive 
no negative repercussions from his or her corresponding constitutional 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights. 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
100. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
101. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244–45 (2009).  
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qualified immunity defense, in addition to the substantive question of 
whether a constitutional right existed and was violated, the court 
must also make the slightly different inquiry whether such a right was 
“clearly established” at the time of the disputed official action.102 
Thus, the qualified immunity inquiry typically unfolds into two 
additional but related steps. Courts examine how settled the area of 
law from which the violation arose was at the time of the disputed 
conduct103 and whether a reasonably competent person in the 
defendant’s position would have been aware of that law and acted 
accordingly.104 
For nearly a decade, the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz105 
required that lower courts should first decide the substantive question 
of whether a right existed and was violated before moving on to the 
question of whether qualified immunity nonetheless applied.106 Courts 
and commentators dubbed this the “rigid order of battle.”107 While 
imposing a mandatory burden on courts hearing § 1983 claims to 
always decide the substantive issue on the merits,108 it had the virtue 
ensuring the development of the underlying constitutional doctrines at 
issue.109 However, the Court softened its stance in Pearson v. 
Callahan,110 declaring that the order in which deciding courts analyzed 
the issues in qualified immunity cases would henceforth be 
discretionary rather than mandatory.111  
Apparently motivating the about-face was mounting frustration 
with the judicial burden involved with deciding novel constitutional 
 
102. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
103. E.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2011). 
104. Id. 
105. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
106. Id. at 200–01. 
107. E.g., Derrick, supra note 97, at 248. The phrase appears to have derived 
from Justice Breyer’s dissent in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–
02 (2004). 
108. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. 
109. Id. at 201. 
110. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Although not relevant to this Comment, Pearson 
was a Fourth Amendment case involving a circuit split over the 
“consent once removed” theory applied by some courts as an exception 
to the search warrant requirement. Id. at 229. Essentially, it provides 
that a suspect who unwittingly allows an undercover officer or 
informant into his house also effectively consents to additional officers 
entering without a warrant. Id. The officers argued that they were 
entitled to qualified immunity based on the circuit split. Id. 
111. Id. at 236. 
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issues.112 In such cases, judges confront the difficult task of 
comprehensively analyzing the legal arguments and analogous 
precedent, even though the average government officer could not 
possibly be expected to know the answer to the constitutional 
question.113 Yet the Court did not explicitly reject the Saucier 
sequence. Instead, the Court held that the procedure would 
presumably still be proper in a great many cases,114 but some 
commentators have argued that it did so without any meaningful 
guidance as to precisely what lower courts should consider when 
deciding to begin with the merits or proceed directly to whether the 
right was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes.115 
Unsurprisingly, Pearson has resulted in a judicial mindset that 
ossifies the law,116 rather than simply affording lower courts sensible 
flexibility in determining which issues to hear. Instead of spending 
significant time—and risking being reversed—on vexing constitutional 
questions, many lower courts have instead applied Pearson as a de 
facto qualified-immunity-first rule.117 The detriment that such an 
overly rigid application of constitutional avoidance presents should 
not be understated.118 Ironically, once one district court judge decides, 
using his or her Pearson discretion, that a particular right is not 
clearly established, and a Court of Appeals affirms, nearly all future 
discretion for other judges within the circuit to decide factually 
related cases on the merits is effectively lost. Any discretion that does 
remain will eventually vanish, as more cases are decided within a 
respective circuit on “clearly established” rather than substantive 
constitutional grounds and judges in that circuit feel additional 
pressure to follow suit rather than undertake the more arduous 
Saucier sequence.119 The cumulative uncertainty that Pearson 
unleashed cannot have been what the Court intended, and yet it will 
remain the gremlin in § 1983’s machinery until the Court provides 
further guidance.  
112. Id. at 235–40. 
113. Id. at 237. 
114. Id. at 232, 236, 242. 
115. E.g., Derrick, supra note 97, at 248; Jack M. Beermann, Qualified 
Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 139, 171 
(2009). 
116. See infra Part II.C and III.A. 
117. See infra Part III.A. 
118. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (“[I]f those officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity, a court can dismiss the damages claim 
without ever deciding its merits—and so the qualified immunity 
situation threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in 
limbo.”). 
119. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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C. Glik-ety Split: Those Who Decide and Those Who Abstain 
In many ways, the unique combination of circumstances 
surrounding the proliferation of smart phones and its attendant First 
Amendment consequences provides an ideal illustration of Pearson’s 
dysfunction. From a chronology standpoint, the case was decided in 
2009,120 just before smart phone ownership reached its tipping point 
among American adults.121 Therefore, unlike many criminally 
proscribed activities,122 most recording of police action involves using 
a tool widely possessed and routinely used123 by a majority of the 
populace. When combined with the relatively benign nature of the 
activity itself, and a lack of demonstrable negative externalities to 
society,124 this arguably increases the majority’s ability to identify 
with those prosecuted under misapplied laws. But most importantly, 
the smart phone handily exemplifies a technology that the Framers 
could not possibly have envisioned,125 highlighting the need for 
 
120. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 223 (2009). 
121. See Dara Kerr, Smartphone Ownership Reaches Critical Mass in the 
U.S., CNET News (June 5, 2013, 5:35 PM), http://news. 
cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57587932-94/smartphone-ownership-reaches-
critical-mass-in-the-u.s/ (showing a steady rise in smartphone ownership 
among U.S adults, from 35% in 2011 to 56% in 2013). 
122. Consider, for example, that the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services reports that in 2012, only 7% of adults aged 26 or older 
engaged in illicit drug use. Results from the 2012 National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs. 17, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
NSDUH/2012SummNatFindDetTables/NationalFindings/NSDUHresults
2012.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
123. See Leslie Horn, 43 Percent of People Use Their Cell Phone as Their 
Primary Camera, Poll Finds, PC Mag (June 27, 2011, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387677,00.asp (reporting the 
results of a survey in which 43% of respondents used their cell phone as 
their primary camera, while an additional 21% use it in conjunction 
with a regular camera). No word yet on whether the continued rise of 
traditional camera use among hipsters has altered these results. See 
Amanda Golden, Teen Hipsters Discover Joys of Analog Photography, 
CNET (last updated May 16, 2011, 4:09 PM), http://news.cnet.com 
/8301-1023_3-20062810-93.html (kidding, of course). 
124. Compare Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting how 
video recording “memorializes, without impairing, [police] work in public 
spaces”), with Joey Scarborough et al., Alec Baldwin Gets Into Street 
Scuffle with NY Photographer, Pins Man Against Hood of Car, NY Daily 
News (last updated Aug. 28, 2013, 1:46 AM), http://www. 
nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/alec-baldwin-street-scuffle-new-
york-photographer-article-1.1438362 (highlighting the virtues of 
photographers keeping a reasonable distance from their subjects). 
125. E.g., Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Doctrinal Stress or In Need of a Face Lift: 
Examining the Difficulty in Warrantless Searches of Smartphones Under 
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elasticity when ascertaining the boundaries of previously recognized 
categories of protected speech.126 The four circuits to tackle the issue 
have recognized this, fitting the citizens’ right to film police 
comfortably inside long-recognized categories of protected speech.127 
But such doctrinal flexibility is conspicuously absent from the terse 
decisions in the two circuits that chose to proceed solely under the 
“clearly established” prong of the § 1983 analysis while leaning 
heavily on Pearson.128 
1. Courts That Find a First Amendment Right to Record  
on the Constitutional Merits 
The first decision by a circuit concerning the constitutionality of 
recording police, Fordyce v. City of Seattle,129 occurred in 1995 before 
the advent of the smartphone130 or even the widespread popularity of 
cellular phones in general.131 Fordyce involved an activist who was 
 
the Fourth Amendment’s Original Intent, 33 Whittier L. Rev. 571 
(2012). 
126. Cf. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (regarding the right to “gather and disseminate 
information”) (“The filming of government officials engaged in their 
duties in a public place, including police officers performing their 
responsibilities, fits comfortably within these principles.”). 
127. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995); Smith v. City of 
Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 
(1st Cir. 2011); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
128. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009); Kelly v. Borough 
of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
129. 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995). 
130. Although IBM debuted a device known as Simon in 1993 that could 
technically lay claim to the title of “first smartphone,” it was not until 
the debut of the BlackBerry a decade later that a smartphone achieved 
widespread adoption by the U.S. public. Compare Ira Sager, Before 
IPhone and Android Came Simon, the First Smartphone, Bloomberg 
Businessweek (June 29, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/ 
2012-06-29/before-iphone-and-android-came-simon-the-first-smartphone, 
with Felix Gillette et al., The Rise and Fall of BlackBerry: An Oral 
History, Bloomberg Businessweek (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www. 
businessweek.com/articles/2013-12-05/the-rise-and-fall-of-blackberry-an-
oral-history#p3. 
131. According to the CTIA, a wireless industry association, there were 
slightly over 28.1 million cell phone subscribers in June 1995, a month 
after Fordyce was decided. CTIA, June 2010 Semi-Annual Wireless 
Industry Survey 3 (2010), available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/ 
CTIA__Survey_Midyear_2010_Graphics.pdf. The Census Bureau 
estimated the 1995 U.S. population at 262.7 million people, placing the 
percentage of cell phone ownership around 10.7%. Paul Campbell, 
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections: States, 1995–
2025, at 3 (1997), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2/pop/ 
p25/p25-1131.pdf. 
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arrested while “videoptap[ing] [a] demonstration for local television 
production, presumably for broadcast on a public access channel,” on 
a camcorder.132 When the activist decided to film the police’s reaction 
to the crowd’s heated behavior, one officer “attempted physically to 
dissuade [the activist] from his mission.”133 In reinstating the activist’s 
§ 1983 suit, the Ninth Circuit recognized a “right to film matters of 
public interest.”134 While little analysis was devoted to precisely where 
this right came from,135 it can be comfortably assumed that it was 
derivative of either, or some combination, of two broader, previously 
recognized First Amendment categories referenced elsewhere in the 
opinion: “the right to gather news”136 or the right to “publicly 
gathering information.”137  
The Eleventh Circuit was similarly succinct in its opinion five 
years later in Smith v. City of Cumming,138 holding that 
“photograph[ing] or videotap[ing]” police was protected under “the 
right to gather information about what public officials do on public 
property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public 
interest.”139 The court noted the right to record police was subject to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, but declined to 
provide further specificity.140 At the time these early cases were 
decided, portable video cameras were readily available,141 but did not 
 
132. 55 F.3d at 438. 
133. Id. According to the activist, the officer smashed the camera in his face. 
Id. at 439. There was also a separate, but somewhat related, § 1983 
violation in the initial complaint stemming from the activist’s arrest by 
a different officer for filming two private citizens later in the day. The 
activist spent a night in jail and eventually the charges were dropped. 
Id. at 438. The main issue in that § 1983 claim, which the Ninth Circuit 
held was properly dismissed under qualified immunity, was whether 
there was sufficient probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to 
justify the arrest for violating state privacy statutes. Id. at 439–40. 
134. Id. at 439. 
135. The First Circuit in Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011), 
actually attributed this “terseness [to] implicitly speak[] to the 
fundamental and virtually self-evident nature of the First Amendment’s 
protections in this area.”  
136. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438. 
137. Id. at 439. 
138. 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). 
139. Id. at 1333. Smith was ultimately dismissed not on qualified immunity 
grounds but because the plaintiff failed to factually establish that his 
constitutional rights were violated. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Sony launched the first consumer camcorder in 1983 with the release of 
the Beta Movie BMC-100. History of the Video Camera, Sony.net, 
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yet provide the ability for most people to routinely carry around 
filming devices in their pocket on a daily basis. Nonetheless, both 
cases were decided well after the Rodney King beating exposed the 
powerful effect citizen filming could have.142 In this way, perhaps the 
relatively short length of the opinions from these circuits compared to 
those that emerged from later ones can be compared to a Newton’s 
Cradle.143 Past events involving video cameras had aptly 
demonstrated the virtues served by increased police-work 
transparency, but the limitations in the technology caused a loss of 
momentum over time (in this case, in terms of judicially perceived 
importance to society). Only by reintroducing momentum to the 
system, in terms of the virtual ubiquity of recording devices, would 
the importance of the issue force courts to sufficiently clarify the 
existence and source of the right to film police. 
Indeed, when the First Circuit became the first to tackle the issue 
of police recording in the smartphone era in Glik v. Cunniffe,144 its 
approach was considerably more systematic. The court began with the 
text of the First Amendment, noting that “the text’s proscription on 
laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’ . . . 
encompasses a range of conduct related to the gathering and 
dissemination of information,”145 and “‘prohibit[s] government from 
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public 
may draw.’”146 The First Circuit then explained how “filming 
government officials engaged in their duties in a public place . . . fits 
comfortably within these principles,”147 drawing on several past 
Supreme Court precedent to highlight how public dissemination of 
 
http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/CorporateInfo/History/sonyhistory-
f.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
142. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
143. The popular office toy employs five equally sized spheres suspended 
from strings. When the user lifts and releases a sphere on either end, it 
strikes the others and demonstrates the physical transfer of momentum 
with a reciprocal action on the other end. Over time, however, the 
reciprocal movements become less pronounced as momentum leaves the 
system and the spheres gradually come to rest. See Gary Antonick, 
Numberplay: How Does Newton’s Cradle Work?, N.Y. Times, (Dec. 6, 
2010, 11:58 AM), http://wordplay.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/ 
numberplay-newtons-cradle/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
144. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). Glik involved an attorney bystander who 
used his cell phone to record officers employing what he believed to be 
excessive force in arresting another man. Id. at 79–80. 
145. Id. at 82 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). 
146. Id (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 
(1978)).  
147. Id. 
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information concerning public officials’ conduct uncovers abuse and 
results in higher standards of official behavior.148 The court concluded 
its analysis with a practical observation in tribute to the times: 
“[N]ews stories are now just as likely to be broken by a blogger at her 
computer as a reporter at a major newspaper.”149 
The First Circuit’s analysis of the First Amendment right to 
record public officials in Glik was not completely unqualified; it too 
mentioned the necessity of “reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.”150 But the court emphasized how narrowly tailored such 
restrictions would have to be, holding them inapposite to a person 
“‘film[ing] [officers] from a comfortable remove’” without “‘[speaking] 
to nor molest[ing] them in any way’ (except in directly responding to 
the officers when they addressed him [or her]),”151 while present in a 
“traditional public space[].”152 Consequently, the First Circuit 
seemingly laid down a nearly unfettered right for nonthreatening 
third-party recorders in public places. 
The ACLU sought to build upon this third-party right by its 
procedural posturing in American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. 
Alvarez.153 Perhaps recognizing that third-party recorders present the 
most sympathetic plaintiffs, the ACLU sought to organize a “police 
accountability program,”154 under which members would openly and 
systematically use their cell phones to record officers while they 
performed their duties in public.155 Unlike Fordyce, Smith, and Glik, 
which were actions for damages, the Alvarez suit used § 1983 to seek 
declaratory and injunctive relief.156 After overcoming initial standing 
hurdles,157 the Seventh Circuit emphasized the importance of not 
allowing laws to foreclose “‘entire medium[s] of expression.’”158 
Regardless of when the speech restriction occurs,159 said the court, it 
reduces the quality and quantity of the public’s supply of  
148. Id. at 82–84. 
149. Id. at 84. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. (quoting Iacobucci v. Boutler, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999). 
152. Id. 
153. 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
154. Id. at 588. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 590–94. See also infra notes 201–209 and accompanying text 
(discussing standing and other issues with alternative causes of action). 
158. Id. at 595 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994)). 
159. Id. at 596. See also McDonald, supra note 27 (developing this theory in 
more detail).  
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information,160 which weakens crucial links in the chain of public 
official accountability.161 As such, it “burden[ed] First Amendment 
rights directly,”162 and the court granted the injunction.163 
The Alvarez decision was important in one other regard as well. It 
provided the most comprehensive “time, place, and manner”164 
discussion of any police recording case to date, taking the time to 
actually determine and apply the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny 
to the Illinois’ anti-eavesdropping statute. Because the statute was 
likely content-neutral,165 the court examined it under intermediate 
scrutiny, which requires “an important public-interest justification 
. . . and . . . a reasonably close fit between the law’s means and its 
ends.”166 From there, a simple syllogism demonstrated why the statute 
was unconstitutional. If the privacy of citizens’ conversations is the 
public-interest justification, and Katz v. United States167 holds that 
what citizens expose to the public carries no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, then “by legislating [so] broadly—by making it a crime to 
record any conversation, even those that are not in fact private—the 
State has severed the link between the eavesdropping statute’s means 
and its ends.”168 This simple yet elegant argument would seem to 
provide the template to strike down any similar misapplication of 
other eavesdropping or anti-wiretapping statutes, and yet the 
challenges in other circuits have not come. Alvarez, to which the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari,169 remains the most recent Court of 
Appeals decision concerning citizens’ rights to film police. 
What accounts for this slow-down? Is there simply a lack of 
quality plaintiffs? Perhaps. But there are a couple of other potential 
explanations, with very different respective implications. The first is 
simply that Alvarez and its slightly older brethren, with no real 
opposition on the substantive issue in other circuits, have been very 
influential on lower courts and among law enforcement, tilting the 
scales towards constitutional protection.170 Another more alarming 
 
160. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596. 
161. Id. at 597. 
162. Id. at 603. 
163. Id. at 608.  
164.  Id. at 605.  
165. Id.  
166. Id. 
167. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
168. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606. 
169. 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
170. There is some support for this argument in the opinions of lower courts 
in circuits that have yet to take a position on the First Amendment 
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possibility exists, though. Given that two circuits affirmed district 
court decisions that held the right to record police was not “clearly 
established” from a qualified immunity standpoint,171 lower courts 
may simply be opting for the path of least resistance under Pearson 
at a greater rate than before.172 Rather than tilting the scales for 
constitutional protection—or, more likely, against it—such cases leave 
their thumbs off of the scales entirely.  
right to record police. See, e.g., Crawford v. Geiger, No. 3:13CV1883, 
2014 WL 554469, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014) (case within the Sixth 
Circuit citing Alvarez, Glik, Smith, and Fordyce as representing 
“unanimity among the circuits having decided the precise issue in this 
case”). The Sixth Circuit had previously passed on the issue. See Ross 
v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. 
Wells, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1277 n.4 (N.D. Okla. 2011) (case within 
the Tenth Circuit citing Smith approvingly for the proposition that 
police officers are reasonably subject to public scrutiny); Barnes v. 
Timmons, No. 12-cv-01042-WJM-KMT, 2013 WL 439069, at *5 (D. 
Colo. Feb. 5, 2013) (case within the Tenth Circuit assuming plaintiff 
had First Amendment right to photograph officer, but dismissing on 
plaintiff’s factual admissions); Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass’n, 
No. 04 Civ. 3199(LAP), 2005 WL 646093, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 
2005) (case within the Second Circuit referring to Fordyce and Smith as 
dealing with protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment, 
but ultimately differentiating by asserting that not all photography is 
communicative). Two of the more publicized sets of internal police 
policies respecting the right to record police come from Baltimore and 
Washington D.C. See Baltimore Police Dep’t, Gen. Order J-16, 
Video Recording of Police Activity (2011); D.C. Metro. 
Police Dep’t, General Order OPS-304-19, Video Recording, 
Photographing, and Audio Recording of Metropolitan Police 
Department Members by the Public (2012). 
171. See infra Part II.C.2. 
172. See, e.g., Mesa v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 10464(JPO), 2013 WL 
31002, at *24–25 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 3, 2013) (disposing of the case because 
the law was not “clearly established,” despite expressing agreement with 
the four circuits recognizing First Amendment protection); Ortiz v. City 
of New York, No. 11 Civ. 7919(JMF), 2013 WL 5339156, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2013) (again disposing of the case on “clearly 
established” grounds, despite the existence of the Mesa decision and the 
Justice Department having taken an official stance on constitutional 
protection); Williams v. Boggs, No. 6:13-65-DCR, 2014 WL 585373, at *5–
6 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2014) (citing Kelly and Szymecki, after noting “there is 
no authority from the Sixth Circuit clearly establishing any right to film a 
police officer”). Other cases have seized upon the “time, place, and 
manner” language in the circuit opinions to dispose of the cases on 
narrow grounds, despite the fact that time, place, and manner 
restrictions are intensely fact-bound and often require substantive 
discussion as extensive as would be required to determine the underlying 
constitutional issue. See, e.g., Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 
11-1009 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 312881, at *51–58 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2013); 
Magnan v. Doe, No. 11-753 (JNE/SER), 2012 WL 5247325, at *10 (D. 
Minn. July 6, 2012). 
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2. Courts That Decline to Examine a First Amendment Right to 
Record by Disposing of Cases on the “Clearly Established”  
Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis 
In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,173 a passenger in a vehicle that 
was pulled over filmed the traffic stop using a hand-held camera.174 
The officer notified the passenger and driver that he was videotaping 
their encounter from a dashboard cam and recording audio from a 
microphone attached to his lapel, yet when he noticed immediately 
thereafter that the passenger was recording him, he confiscated the 
passenger’s camera.175 After consulting with an assistant prosecutor 
and calling in an additional three officers for assistance, he then 
arrested the passenger.176 As the officers escorted the passenger to the 
jail, one of them rhetorically remarked, “When are you guys going to 
learn you can’t record us.?”177 As might be predicted, the prosecutor 
eventually dropped all charges against the passenger, who 
subsequently brought a § 1983 action.178 
In holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for 
any potential First Amendment violations, the Third Circuit 
conspicuously noted the propriety of the district court’s avoidance of 
the ultimate constitutional issue under Pearson, despite the fact that 
there already existed within the circuit at least one case suggesting 
that there “may” be a protected right to film police.179 Turning to the 
“clearly established” question, the Third Circuit noted as a 
preliminary matter that even among courts that had found a First 
Amendment right to film the police there was considerable debate 
regarding whether such a right consisted of blanket protection or 
required sufficiently “expressive or communicative purpose.”180 The 
court then proceeded to factually distinguish other cases where 
protected speech was found—for example, filming in connection with 
political activism,181 meetings of state officials,182 or as part of news 
 
173. 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). 
174. Id. at 251. 
175. Id. at 251–52. 
176. Id. at 252. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 254, 260. This professed exercise of judicial restraint is curious, 
given the court’s later willingness to adopt a new rule that “a police 
officer who relies in good faith on a prosecutor’s legal opinion that the 
arrest is warranted is presumptively entitled to legal immunity.” Id. at 
255–56. 
180. Id. at 259, 262. 
181. Id. at 261. The Third Circuit either mistakenly or disingenuously 
characterized Fordyce as a case where the court recognized a First 
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gathering183—on the basis of supposedly greater expressive purpose.184 
Finally, the court noted in passing that even if there was a right to 
film police, it could be qualified like other speech by “reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions” (although the court devoted no 
analysis as to how such restrictions would fare in a police-recording 
situation).185 
The Third Circuit’s approach in Kelly should be questioned for 
multiple reasons. As a substantive matter, it makes little sense to 
argue that recording police in such a case has no expressive or 
communicative purpose and content. Because any effect that such 
footage will have on the wider public discourse must necessarily come 
after it is filmed and disseminated, its expressive or communicative 
content is antecedent to those acts.186 Similarly, its expressive or 
communicative purpose is often contingent upon what actually  
Amendment right to film “but ultimately grant[ed] qualified immunity 
to police because it was not clearly established under what 
circumstances conversation in public could be protected under state 
privacy statute.” Id. However, qualified immunity was granted in 
Fordyce regarding whether it was “clearly established” that probable 
cause was not present under the Fourth Amendment when applying 
state privacy laws to private individuals, not for the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment claims against public officials, which were reinstated. See 
supra note 133 and accompanying text. The district court had also 
taken the impermissible procedural step of instituting declaratory relief 
sua sponte without notifying the parties. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 
F.3d 436, 441–42 (9th Cir. 1995). Even regarding filming private citizens 
in public places, however, the Ninth Circuit cautioned: “Fordyce was, 
and still is, uncertain and insecure regarding his right vel non to 
videotape and audiotape private persons on public streets. . . . [T]he 
circumstances culminating in his arrest. . . are a ‘brooding presence,’ 
which cast an adverse effect on his legitimate interests as a citizen of the 
United States.” Id. at 440 (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land 
Mgmt., Medford Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
182. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 261. 
183. Id. at 261–62. 
184. Id. at 262. 
185. Id. 
186. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The 
act of making an . . . audiovisual recording is necessarily included within 
the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a 
corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. . . . [T]here 
is no fixed First Amendment line between the act of creating the speech 
and the speech itself . . . .”). See also Brncik, supra note 14, at 504 (“If 
a state prevents citizens from recording their interactions with police, it 
arguably deprives citizens of due process and their right to present a 
defense at trial by preventing this evidence from being created at the 
outset.”); Potere, supra note 13, at 302–12 (analyzing prohibitions on 
recording as prior restraints); McDonald, supra note 27 (arguing for 
greater doctrinal recognition of a right to gather information). 
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transpires between the policeman and the citizen. Videos of police 
officers performing their duties reasonably will seldom end up on 
YouTube.187 In effect, the citizen is saying, “I’m not sure what is 
going to transpire, but if something objectionable happens, I may 
want to be able to show someone else in the future.” Accordingly, the 
Third Circuit’s apparent requirement that the expressive or 
communicative nature of both the activity’s content and purpose need 
be established before First Amendment protection attaches is overly 
restrictive,188 if not completely illogical. The court’s run-down of the 
inherently fact-bound time, place, and manner restriction doctrine189 
also contributes little to the opinion without any actual analysis of 
how it would apply in the context of the case at hand. 
More importantly, the Kelly opinion highlights another flaw in the 
way lower courts have approached Pearson. The preceding paragraph, 
and much of the Third Circuit’s opinion, grapples with the 
substantive constitutional question under the guise of answering the 
“clearly established” question.190 Indeed, in many cases involving novel 
but plausible individual rights questions, a well-reasoned opinion that 
begins with the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis will nevertheless have embedded within it a significant 
substantive constitutional discussion component.191  
The alternative to doctrinal overlap between the two prongs of 
the qualified immunity analysis is not much more appealing, though. 
In Szymecki v. Houck,192 the Fourth Circuit’s opinion did not labor 
 
187. Although the first page of search results on YouTube for “police officer 
performing his duties well” did turn up one notable exception—caught, 
of course, on a dashcam. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/results? 
search_query=police%20officer%20performing%20his%20duties%20well
&sm=3 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
188. See Kreimer, supra note 95, at 377–81 (quoting Alan Clark, 
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive 
Extension 58 (2008) (positing that expression to others is not a 
necessary condition for First Amendment protection, as people 
constantly record events using memory for later reflection, and 
“‘external storage’” assists the “individuals’ freedom to reflect effectively 
on those experiences”). 
189. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
190. Id. at 260–63. 
191. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]here are cases in which there 
would be little if any conservation of judicial resources to be had by 
beginning and ending with a discussion of the ‘clearly established’ 
prong. It often may be difficult to decide whether a right is clearly 
established without deciding precisely what the constitutional right 
happens to be.”). 
192. 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
What Is and What Should Never Be 
1929 
with such difficulties, choosing instead to worry almost exclusively 
about hedging its decision. After an obligatory blurb concerning 
Pearson discretion, the court began by noting that district courts 
“should identify the right at a high level of particularity,” and “need 
not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of 
appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case arose.”193 
Perhaps recognizing cases from other jurisdictions that had held that 
a First Amendment right to film police exists, the Fourth Circuit then 
stated that “[a]ccordingly, if the right is recognized in another circuit 
and not in this circuit, the official will ordinarily retain the immunity 
defense.”194 With all of its bases thus covered, the court then 
concluded its one-page opinion with this perfunctory holding: “Here, 
the district court concluded Szymecki’s asserted First Amendment 
right to record police activities on public property was not clearly 
established in this circuit at the time of the alleged conduct. We have 
thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and 
we agree.”195 In this way, Syzmecki provides a prime example of 
constitutional stagnation,196 the other consequence that can arise from 
unconstrained exercises of Pearson discretion. Cases like Szymecki 
officially make no “incremental advance in the law”197—in this case, 
the First Amendment—but still cast a shadow over the shoulder of 
district court judges considering whether to address the underlying 
substantive issue in future cases.198 
 
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
195. Id. at 853. 
196. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (emphasizing the necessity 
of considering the constitutional issue first in order to develop 
constitutional law); Pearson, 129 F.3d at 816 (citing the same concern 
with “constitutional stagnation” although ultimately making the two-
step procedure optional). 
197. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2044 (2011).  
198. Two cases from within the Third Circuit perfectly illustrate the less-
desirable consequences of Pearson discretion. Once a circuit has spoken 
on the “clearly established” nature of an alleged right—as in Kelly—
district courts, wary of being reversed, treat it as if the circuit rejected 
the constitutional right on the merits. Thus, by rejecting similar 
challenges with a simple citation to the circuit-level case, district courts 
never actually choose to answer the underlying constitutional question 
first. Pearson discretion becomes nothing more than cautious adherence. 
See True Blue Auctions, LLC v. Foster, Civil Action No. 11-242 Erie, 
2012 WL 2149801, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2012) (citing Kelly) (“Given 
the uncertainty in the case law and the lack of authority from the Third 
Circuit, this Court is unable to rule as a matter of law that there was a 
clearly established right to videotape a police officer . . . .”); Fleck v. 
Trs. of Univ, of Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 12-3765, 2014 WL 
460652, at *13–14 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2014) (citing Kelly) (“The 
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Faced with such unsavory results on an increasingly important 
First Amendment issue—opinions with either minimal reasoning or 
reasoning that at least partially implicates the underlying substantive 
issue, with neither advancing the law—the current iteration of 
Pearson doctrine applied by some lower courts seems to have 
backfired in precisely the way Justice Alito assured it would not.199 In 
place of a split comprised of “yeas” and “nays” lies an ambiguous field 
of “yeas” and doubtful “passes.” 
III. Addressing the Obstacles:  
Anchoring the Core and Filling in the Blanks 
It is clear that citizen plaintiffs whose recording activities have 
been wrongfully interfered with by police must overcome the 
stagnation presented by some district courts’ application of Pearson. 
As this Comment will demonstrate, the text of Pearson and other 
precedent may indicate that such stagnation has resulted from a 
flawed interpretation of how much discretion is actually available 
under Pearson. But even if Pearson discretion is reined in, there will 
still be two considerable obstacles to obtaining effective relief. First, 
some courts have held up time, place, and manner exceptions to First 
Amendment protection as a potential hindrance to a right to record 
police activity. The practical importance of such allusions is probably 
overblown due to the scrutiny such exceptions would have to face. 
The second problem, difficulty recovering anything more than 
nominal damages, is more substantial and will likely require legislative 
action. Nonetheless, doctrinal clarification is an important first step 
on the path to vindication of the right to record police officers and 
merits closer examination. 
 
circumstances here differ. The plaintiffs were on a public street, not in a 
car, and initially recorded only their own activity. But when they 
ignored repeated police requests to move from the mosque doorway and 
lower their voices, the landscape changed. [The citizen recorder] refused 
to shift the camera away from the [police] officer’s face, a refusal she 
took as a threat. That disregard led to their arrest and the video 
camera’s seizure. Under such circumstances we hold that there was then 
no clearly-established First Amendment right in our Circuit to film 
police activity where, as here, the plaintiffs actively impeded efforts to 
restore public order.”).  
199. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 821–22 (“Any misgivings concerning our decision 
to withdraw from the mandate set forth in Saucier are unwarranted. . . . 
Moreover, the development if constitutional law is by no means entirely 
dependent on cases in which the defendant may seek qualified 
immunity.”) 
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A. There’s Still Hope: Why the Pearson Problem  
Should Not Be Insurmountable 
If the way courts have exercised Pearson discretion when 
handling First Amendment right-to-record cases has proven 
dysfunctional, what precisely should be done to rectify courts’ 
inaction? One commentator considers Pearson inevitably flawed, 
urging a readoption of Saucier’s “rigid order of battle” for First 
Amendment-related §1983 claims.200 Ignoring the practical 
unlikelihood that the Court would take such a stance just a few years 
after rejecting it, Saucier sequencing does demonstrate certain 
appealing procedural advantages when applied in a First Amendment 
context.  
Recently, members of the Court have repeatedly emphasized that 
because qualified immunity does not apply to suits against 
municipalities or for injunctive relief, such suits, along with criminal 
cases, will provide sufficient vehicles for vindicating individual rights 
and developing constitutional law.201 In some cases and on some issues 
this will certainly be true. However, as Geoffrey Derrick pointed out, 
the civil suit alternatives have drawbacks in the context of individual 
citizens who record police officers.202 Because injunctive relief is 
essentially forward-looking, rather than backward-looking as in 
damage suits, a plaintiff may have Article III standing issues 
stemming from the necessity of pleading facts sufficient enough to 
establish injury-in-fact and redressability.203 Monell suits against 
municipalities require demonstrating policies or practices that 
encourage the allegedly abusive action, a tall task that often requires 
prohibitively arduous amounts of discovery.204 For these reasons, 
 
200. Derrick, supra note 97, at 283–90. 
201. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242–43 (Alito, J.); Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2043–44. 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
202. Derrick, supra note 97, at 276–81. 
203. Id. at 278-79 (“The requirement that a plaintiff assert an ‘irreparable 
injury’ that ‘monetary damages’ cannot remedy stifles § 1983 actions for 
forward-looking injunctive relief as a tool for constitutional 
development. . . . [Further,] suits for injunctive relief will only secure 
injury-in-fact and therefore standing where the plaintiff can prove a 
credible threat of future prosecution.”) For example, a plaintiff would 
have to establish a concrete plan to systematically record police activity 
in the future, as the ACLU did in Alvarez. Such a bar—essentially 
requiring premeditated, coordinated action—seems unfairly high to an 
individual plaintiff seeking to vindicate an isolated violation of his or her 
rights. 
204. Id. at 281–83. Given that it is unlikely a department will have a written 
policy discouraging citizens from recording police, a potential plaintiff 
would have to prove custom, which would not encompass a defendant 
officer who chose to go rogue. 
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Monell suits often result in settlement rather than decision on the 
constitutional merits.205  
The probability of a criminal suit vindicating a right to record 
police presents its own difficulties. In a criminal case, the accused 
would invoke the First Amendment as part of a defense asserting that 
the statute he or she was prosecuted under was unconstitutional. But 
as the cases at the circuit level demonstrate, practical-minded 
prosecutors often opt to drop questionable charges206 rather than 
pursue them at the risk of having a court invalidate portions or 
particular applications of the law at issue. In this way such statutes 
remain a tool for overzealous police officers to immediately halt 
citizen-recording activity they find offensive. Seize the phone, take the 
citizen into custody temporarily, wait for the prosecutor to drop the 
charges, release the citizen, and return the phone—and perhaps delete 
some footage along the way.207 Obviously no constitutional law gets 
 
205. Id. at 282-83. 
206. See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995); Kelly 
v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2010); Jeremy Kohler, 
Cameras, Cops, and the First Amendment, Crime Report (Nov. 2, 
2011, 5:13 PM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-
justice/2011-11--cameras-cops-and-the-first-amendment; Cf. Jim 
Schaefer, No Charges for Detroit Free Press Photographer or Police 
Officer After Cell-Phone Seizure and Arrest, Detroit Free Press 
(Aug. 24, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130823/ 
NEWS01/308230111/detroit-free-press-photographer-mandi-wright-
officer-Lamar-Penn (illustrating another evasion option: arrest an 
individual without ever charging him or her). 
207. See Diana Marcum et al., FBI Probes Death in Kern County: Federal 
Review Comes Amid Questions of Evidence Tampering in Deputies’ 
Beating of a Man on Video, L.A. Times, May 15, 2013, at A1 
(reporting witnesses’ statements that video recordings of police beating 
a man to death were missing when the police returned witnesses’ 
confiscated phones). In one of the more extreme examples of destroying 
evidence, police, after shooting a man, demanded that a bystander turn 
over the phones he used to record the incident. When he refused, police 
swarmed the vehicle, ordered the recorder out, and then smashed the 
phone. Luckily, the recorder had the foresight to store the SD card 
under his tongue. Mike Masnick, Miami Beach Police Tried to Destroy 
Video from Bystanders, Holding Them at GunPoint, TechDirt (June 
7, 2011, 8:29 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110607/ 
00012014582/miami-beach-police-tried-to-destroy-video-bystanders-
holding-them-gunpoint.shtml. A year later, the same police department 
seized a woman’s cell phone from her after she recorded them shooting 
her stepfather in their apartment. See Gary Nelson, Cops Seize Cell 
Phone Shooting Video After Police-Involved Shooting, CBS Miami 
(Nov. 30, 2012, 6:56 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2012/11/30/cops-
seize-cell-phone-shooting-video-after-police-involved-shooting/ (noting 
suspicion at the police’s motives by the head of the local ACLU). See 
also Shaw, supra note 3, at 176 (describing an encounter where a man’s 
confiscated cell phone was returned without its memory card).  
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developed in such a scenario. Of equal importance, while the citizen 
incurs no criminal liability, his or her rights remain thoroughly 
transgressed without prospect of relief absent the personal right of 
action against the officer provided by § 1983. Presumably, few would 
classify this as a good-faith exercise of public officials’ discretionary 
functions.208  
A § 1983 individual-damages claim where the court answers the 
constitutional question on the merits prior to moving on to the 
qualified immunity question is less likely to suffer from any of these 
risky procedural shortcomings.209 
But despite its attraction, a return to Saucier mandatory 
sequencing, even just for First Amendment claims, does not solve the 
issue that the Court sought to address in the first place in Pearson. 
The Court in Pearson sought to allow district courts leeway to 
separate cases where hearing the underlying constitutional issue was 
“worthwhile”210 for the “development of constitutional precedent”211 
from “factbound”212 cases where the “substantial expenditure of scarce 
judicial resources”213 is wasted on presumably farfetched constitutional 
arguments that are unlikely “to make a meaningful contribution to 
such development.”214 While the Court clearly had the often-
perplexing contours of the Fourth Amendment in mind215 when it 
made this observation, its First Amendment jurisprudence has, at 
times, been similarly tortuous and fact dependent.216 And, as alluded 
to earlier, the winds of judicial opinion among the Court’s members 
 
208. Although the Court rejected a subjective good faith component as part 
of the qualified immunity inquiry in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815–18 (1982), presumably it is still an acceptable aspirational standard 
for society when assessing public-official conduct. 
209. Derrick, supra note 97, at 278, 291. 
210. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.223, 242 (2009). 
211. Id. at 236–37. 
212. Id. at 237. 
213. Id. at 236. 
214. Id. at 237. 
215. See id. (citing Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(“We do not think the law elaboration purpose will well be served here, 
where the Fourth Amendment inquiry involves a reasonableness 
question which is highly idiosyncratic and heavily dependent on the 
facts.”). 
216. Consider the subtle doctrinal nuances present in Justice Stewart’s classic 
take on obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964): “I shall 
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion 
picture involved in this case is not that.” 
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are also blowing against such a radical turnaround. Pearson was a 
unanimous decision;217 presumably the whole Court was concerned 
with the administrative burdens of mandatory Saucier sequencing.  
It is also becoming increasingly clear that a significant contingent 
of the Court’s members is willing to go even further. In Camreta v. 
Greene,218 Justice Scalia’s concurrence was blunt, noting that 
although “[t]he parties have not asked us to adopt [ending ‘the 
extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional questions 
unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity’], . . . I 
would be willing to consider it in an appropriate case.”219 Justice 
Kennedy, joined in dissent by Justice Thomas, explained the rationale 
for doing so as elimination of what he saw as a constitutional 
aberration that contradicted the Article III case-or-controversy mode 
of adjudication.220 Justice Kennedy disapprovingly noted that the 
Court’s grant of discretion in Pearson “make[s] dictum precedent, in 
order to hasten the gradual process of constitutional interpretation 
and alter the behavior of government defendants.”221 Instead, Justice 
Kennedy clearly expressed a desire for more “incremental advance[s] 
in the law”222 through cases with alternative procedural settings223 
more in line with the Court’s doctrine of constitutional avoidance.224 
While the practical efficacy of those alternative procedural settings 
has been criticized,225 it is quite evident that the Court is unwilling to 
force lower courts to answer the underlying constitutional question in 
every qualified immunity suit. 
1. Reemphasizing District Court Consideration of the Pearson Factors 
by Requiring Findings on the Record 
If wholesale reversion to Saucier is not a viable option, what 
might be a more reasonable “refinement [for the Court to make] 
to . . . qualified immunity jurisprudence?”226 This Comment suggests 
that actually requiring district courts to comply with Pearson may be 
a good starting point. What is truly frustrating about cases like Kelly 
and Szymecki is that the lower courts seemingly acted as if they had 
 
217. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 226.  
218. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
219. Id. at 2036. 
220. Id. at 2037–45. 
221. Id. at 2040. 
222. Id. at 2044. 
223. Id. at 2043–44. 
224. Id. at 2045. 
225. See supra notes 202–205 and accompanying text. 
226. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2044. 
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unbounded discretion, rather than the broad—although still limited—
discretion actually announced in Pearson. For this reason, this 
Comment posits that requiring district courts to make findings on the 
record227 demonstrating their actual consideration of the factors228 
announced in Pearson and related precedent will serve an important 
goal. Such a requirement will arguably better align lower-court 
reasoning with the language of and policies underlying Pearson. As 
this Comment will demonstrate, once such an alignment is achieved, 
 
227. Perhaps most on-point to Pearson discretion is the requirement of “an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay” in a Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b) determination allowing entry of partial final judgment, 
as it implicates a similar balancing of administrative considerations and 
fairness to the parties. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 
U.S. 1 (1980). District court factor-consideration findings on the record 
are required in many other contexts. While some are legislatively 
mandated, others are judicially imposed in common law fashion, 
especially in criminal settings. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(c)(1)(A)(ii) (judicially promulgated rule under the Rules Enabling 
Act) (allowing a district court to waive the probation officer’s 
presentence investigation if “the court finds that the information in the 
record enables it to meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority under 
18 U.S.C. §3553, and the court explains its finding on the record”), and 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–95 (1993) 
(judicially imposed requirement of findings concerning admissibility of 
scientific expert testimony, based on interpretation of legislatively 
enacted Fed. R. Evid. 702), with Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 
530–31 (1972) (judicially imposed requirement in cases raising the Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial), and Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 
750, 755 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Resolution of the speedy trial issue also 
requires a balancing of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo . . . 
based on appropriate findings of fact and that balancing is a matter for 
the district court in the first instance.”). State courts utilize findings on 
the record in child custody and sentencing proceedings as well. Reid v. 
Reid, 213 P.3d 353, 356, 358 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted) (“The court shall make specific findings 
on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the 
decision is in the best interests of the child. . . . The rationale for this 
requirement is not simply to aid appellate review . . . but also to 
provide the family court with a necessary ‘baseline’ against which to 
measure any future petitions by either party based on ‘changed 
circumstances.’); (Mich. Ct. R. Prac. 6.425 (citing People v. Oliver, 
427 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)) (“Requirement that court 
articulate on the record reasons for the sentence was not satisfied where 
court gave no reason for sentence imposed, even though sentence 
imposed was within sentence recommended by sentencing guidelines.”). 
228. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–40 (2009). Although the 
significance of Justice Alito’s discussion of which cases should sensibly 
be analyzed constitutional issue-first is not immediately clear (i.e., 
whether it is simply dictum or more concrete guidance), the status of 
these considerations as factors was later confirmed in Camreta. See infra 
note 246 and accompanying text. 
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lower courts will be less prone to simply hide the ball on important 
constitutional issues like a First Amendment right to record police. 
The argument that Pearson did not stand for unbounded 
discretion must begin with the language of the opinion itself. 
Critically, the Court held that “judges of the district courts and the 
courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound 
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 
circumstances in the particular case at hand.”229 The use of the 
modifier “sound” in the most critical sentence of the central holding of 
the case is important.  
Two fair interpretations can arise from its use. The first should be 
thought of as the “weak” interpretation of the word’s importance. 
Under this interpretation, the Court was simply giving the lower 
courts a “pat on the back” by describing their judgment on 
discretionary matters as generally sound. The second should be 
thought of as the “strong” interpretation of the word’s importance. 
Under this interpretation, the Court was limiting the lower court’s 
discretion to that within reasonable—and reasoned230—bounds. This 
Comment posits that the strong interpretation of “sound” better 
accords with the context of Pearson and other precedent. 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary attributes the following definitions 
to the word sound (among others): “free from error, fallacy, or 
misapprehension,” “exhibiting or based on thorough knowledge and 
experience,” “legally valid” or “logically valid and having true 
premises,” and “showing good judgment or sense.”231 If the Court were 
simply noting or assuming that the lower courts’ judgment on 
discretionary matters was “sound” within any of these definitions, its 
insertion into the opinion would at best be redundant, because 
 
229. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added). 
230. In an administrative law context, the Court has repeatedly expressed 
dissatisfaction with agency decisions rendered without adequate 
reasoning based on the administrative record. See Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413, 419 (1971) (“Plainly, 
there is ‘law to apply’ . . . . [A]n administrative record that allows the full, 
prompt review of the Secretary’s action . . . . That administrative record is 
not, however, before us. The lower courts based their review on the 
litigation affidavits that were presented. These affidavits were merely ‘post 
hoc’ rationalizations, . . . which have traditionally been found to be an 
inadequate basis for review.”). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the 
U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1973) (applying “hard 
look” review to an agency decision); Matthew Warren, Note, Active 
Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the Hard Look 
Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 Geo. L.J. 2599 (2002) (exploring the 
origins and purposes of hard look doctrine). 
231. Sound(1) Definition, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
1192 (11th ed. 2004). 
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exercises of unbounded discretion would already be correct and 
unreviewable as a matter of course.232 Rather than attributing the 
“sound” modifier no meaning, the overall context of Pearson suggests 
that the better course is to apply a strong interpretation of  
the word.233 
If Pearson discretion was thus meant to be nonabsolute, the next 
step must be to identify limiting principles within the opinion. Justice 
Alito’s majority identifies at least seven types of cases—potential 
underlying principles—that may tip the scales one way or another for 
district courts considering whether to proceed first with the 
constitutional question or the clearly established question. Briefly 
summarized, they are as follows:  
 Is this the type of case “in which there would be little if any 
conservation of judicial resources to be had by beginning 
and ending with a discussion of the ‘clearly established’ 
prong?”234 
 Does this case “[p]romote[] the development of 
constitutional precedent”235 or is it “so factbound that [it] 
provides little guidance for future cases?”236 
 Will hearing this case “result[] in a substantial expenditure 
of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have  
232. Older cases in which the Court uses the phrase “sound discretion” do 
tend to evince the “weak” interpretation. However, the Court’s more 
recent decisions gravitate toward a stronger interpretation. Compare 
Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581, 583–84 (1878) (“It has long been the 
established law in the courts of the United States that to grant or refuse a 
new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the motion is 
addressed, and that the result cannot be made the subject of review upon a 
writ of error.”), with Renico v. Loett, 559 U.S. 766, 775 (2010) (This is 
not to say that we grant absolute deference to trial judges in this context. . . 
. [T]he judge’s exercise of discretion must be ‘sound,’ and we have made 
clear that [i]f the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise 
the ‘sound discretion’ entrusted to him, the reason for such deference by an 
appellate court disappears. Thus if the trial judge acts for reasons 
completely unrelated to the trial problem which purports to be the basis for 
the mistrial ruling, close appellate scrutiny is appropriate. Similarly, if a 
trial judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly, . . . his action cannot be 
condoned.). 
233. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, (1994) (“The trial 
judge . . . treated §5322(a)‘s ‘willfulness’ requirement essentially as 
surplusage—as words of no consequence. Judges should hesitate so to 
treat statutory terms in any setting . . . .”). Presumably common-law 
terms of art should receive similar treatment in context. 
234. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 237. 
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no effect on the outcome of the case?”237 Will it also 
substantially “waste[] the parties’ resources?”238 
 Will the case “soon be decided by a higher court”239 or 
involve “a constitutional question on which [the Supreme 
Court has] just granted certiorari?”240 
 Does the case “rest[] on an uncertain interpretation of state 
law”241 or “require[] clarification of an ambiguous state 
statute?”242 
 Does the case “depend on . . . facts not yet fully 
developed”243 or is “the precise factual basis for the 
plaintiff’s claim or claims . . . hard to identify?”244 
 Is the parties’ “briefing of constitutional questions [in the 
case] . . . woefully inadequate?”245 
Admittedly, the structure of this portion of the Pearson opinion 
makes interpreting its intended effect on subsequent lower court 
decisions difficult. In a void, it may be fair to argue that such 
discussion was pure dicta. But Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in 
Camreta clears up any ambiguity by very clearly referring to this 
section of the Pearson discussion as “factors courts should consider in 
making this determination.”246 This relatively strong, semi-mandatory 
language further solidifies the notion that lower courts are not 
unconstrained in making the Pearson decision. Simply put, there are 
things that they have to consider.247 
 
237. Id. at 818. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 238. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 239. 
244. Id. at 238–39 
245. Id. at 239. 
246. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011) (citing Pearson, 555 
U.S. at 236–42). 
247. The late jurisprudence philosopher Ronald Dworkin analogized these 
discretionary considerations in tough cases to a referee making a difficult 
call in a game: “The referee is not free to give effect to his background 
convictions in deciding this hard case. . . . We have, then, in the case of 
the [] referee, an example of an official whose decisions about 
institutional rights are understood to be governed by institutional 
constraints even when the force of these constraints is not clear. We do 
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Like most such multifactor tests, no single factor need be given 
conclusive or decisive effect.248 It is probably also fair to assume that 
not every factor will apply or need be discussed in every case.249 
Similarly, the Pearson factors are probably not intended to be 
exclusive.250 Indeed, based on past precedent and the functional 
concerns of the federal judiciary as a whole, this Comment suggests 
three additional factors that the Court should consider adding to the 
Pearson analysis to further help guide lower-court discretion. 
In Hope v. Pelzer,251 an Alabama prison inmate sued prison 
guards for tying him to a hitching post in the midday sun without a 
shirt, adequate water, or bathroom breaks, in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.252 The prison 
guards asserted a qualified-immunity defense, arguing under Eleventh 
Circuit precedent that there had to exist cases with “materially 
similar” facts to the one at bar to properly hold defendants 
responsible for violations of “clearly established” constitutional 
rights.253 The Court, in rejecting such a requirement, held that 
“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established 
law even in novel factual circumstances.”254 Noting “the danger of a 
rigid, overreliance on factual similarity,”255 the Court emphasized the 
fair-notice relevance of state regulations and a Department of Justice 
report that expressed the opinion that actions like those taken by the 
guards were indeed unconstitutional.256 In dissent, Justice Thomas 
stridently disagreed with the use of these sources when analyzing  
not think that he is free to legislate interstitially within the ‘open 
texture’ of imprecise rules.” Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously 102 (1977). 
248. See, e.g., League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 501 
n.* (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
249. See, e.g., Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (“No single factor is dispositive, and cases may certainly arise 
where a factor is irrelevant to the facts at hand.”).  
250. See, e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 59–60 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(holding that factors announced in a previous case concerning judicial 
appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant in a civil right suit “were 
not intended as an exclusive list,” but nonetheless reversing because 
“the district court did not properly exercise its discretion”). 
251. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Hope was decided when Saucier’s “rigid order of 
battle” was still governing law, but Pearson did not directly overrule 
Hope’s central holding. 
252. Id. at 733–35. 
253. Id. at 739. 
254. Id. at 741. 
255. Id. at 742. 
256. Id. at 743–45. 
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whether the guards had fair warning that their conduct was a 
constitutional violation.257 In his view, the only proper source of such 
fair warning for purpose of answering the “clearly established” inquiry 
was binding circuit precedent that was on point from a factual 
standpoint—stringently so.258 
Hope contributes two insights to the Pearson analysis. First, 
executive branch pronouncements regarding the constitutional 
ramifications of certain law enforcement actions can be relevant to 
whether an asserted constitutional right is clearly established in the 
context of a particular case.259 Second, the bases of consideration for a 
court answering the “clearly established” question should not be 
artificially constrained; Justice Thomas’s approach was rejected in 
favor of a broader, more practical, totality-of-the-circumstances-type 
inquiry.260 
Therefore, this Comment proposes the following two additions to 
the Pearson factors. First, has a coordinate branch of government 
officially expressed an opinion as to the constitutionality of the 
practice in the case at hand? If so, the benefits of doctrinal 
clarification, as well as proper judicial branch assertion of its role as 
supreme arbiter of the Constitution,261 may militate in favor of 
proceeding constitutional-question-first in a qualified immunity case. 
Second, if no courts within the circuit have answered the substantive 
constitutional question, have courts in other federal circuits? If so, 
Saucier’s rigid order of battle may be advisable in order to advance 
constitutional clarity. Nothing in this factor should be interpreted as 
forcing or subliminally encouraging a district court to agree on the 
merits with the decisions of other circuits on a given constitutional 
issue. On the contrary, even a holding that no such constitutional 
right exists advances the law by creating a genuine circuit split 
instead of an artificial one, such as currently exists in the First 
Amendment right-to-record context. 
The third proposed addition to the Pearson factors derives not 
from Hope but from the language and reasoning of Pearson and 
 
257. Id. at 759–60. 
258. Id. at 755–59. 
259. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
260. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 743 (“Although the facts of the case are not 
identical, [a past decision’s] premise . . . [can have] clear applicability in 
[a later] case.”). 
261. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Deciding whether a 
matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to 
another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch 
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this 
Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”) 
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Camreta. Do alternative causes of action actually exist for similarly 
situated parties to ensure adequate future development of the 
constitutional right at issue?262 The modifiers “actually” and 
“adequate” would help to steer courts to recognize practical 
difficulties in alternative causes of action that seem facially adequate 
but in fact are not legally fungible.263 The “similarly situated parties” 
requirement recognizes the fact that while organizational plaintiffs 
may be able to overcome some of those problems in certain cases,264 it 
is probably unfair to deny all individual plaintiffs the opportunity to 
vindicate their rights or make meaningful doctrinal contributions on 
that basis. In this way, an “alternative cause of action” factor would 
simply add to the Pearson analysis a consideration that already 
clearly figures heavily into several Justices’ conceptions of the 
doctrine of qualified immunity. 
To summarize, the present way that some lower federal courts 
apply Pearson discretion when deciding whether qualified immunity 
attaches is both objectionable and discordant with the language of the 
Pearson decision itself. However, a reversion to Saucier’s rigid order 
of battle—constitutional merits first, “clearly established” right 
second—is quite unlikely. Instead, a less extreme middle ground must 
be found. If the Supreme Court simply required district courts to 
specify the bases of their Pearson decision on the record, it would 
strike a more desirable balance between resolving ambiguity on 
broadly relevant constitutional questions and affording district courts 
the flexibility they need to dismiss questionable § 1983 claims. 
District courts would be prevented from dismissing qualified 
immunity cases based on wholly insufficient or overlapping reasoning, 
or on overly technical rules of decision that allow them to escape 
consideration of constitutional rulings from other circuits. At the 
same time, district courts could still dismiss cases that arguably 
flunked some or all of the Pearson factors and have the benefit of an 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. In short, on-the-record 
Pearson findings would better focus courts on the business of doing 
what Pearson and Hope have already instructed them to do.  
2. The Majority of the Pearson Factors Actually Favor Consideration 
of the First Amendment Right to Record 
In Kelly and Szymecki, the Third and Fourth Circuits declined to 
decide whether there was a right to record police, instead relying on 
Pearson discretion to dispose of the cases on the notion that any such 
 
262. See supra notes 201, 223. 
263. See supra notes 201–207 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 156, 202–203. 
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right was not “clearly established.”265 But a closer examination of the 
factors actually discussed by the Pearson majority, when compared to 
what the respective courts actually said in those two decisions, 
indicates that they arguably fell outside of the discretion granted in 
Pearson. If the cases were decided again today, in light of the added 
factors suggested by this Comment, that conclusion would be even 
further reinforced. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court’s third Pearson factor, the 
cost of litigation to the parties and the court, will frequently, if not 
always, weigh against arguing or deciding the constitutional question. 
Litigation is expensive,266 and courts have limited resources;267 these 
two elements are unlikely to ever be completely absent in any given 
case. As a matter of logic, costs to the parties and the court are also 
likely to be highly correlated as litigation continues. Thus, for most 
Pearson analyses, the cost of litigation and burden on the court will 
be placed on the side of the ledger that counsels against hearing the 
case, although its force will certainly vary in the context of the other 
factors in a particular case. If a plaintiff has adopted a “shotgun-
effect” complaint, consisting of a multitude of alleged violations of 
constitutional and statutory rights of varying levels of plausibility, 
then cost considerations may carry more force than they would in a 
scenario where a complaint contained one or two well-pleaded, well-
reasoned violations. Given the presence of at least six other factors 
identified by the Court in Pearson, district courts should be hesitant 
to attach conclusive effect to cost without turning to mitigating 
considerations. 
The Kelly court did not explicitly refer to cost as a justification 
for the district court’s decision, but it is probably fair to excuse that 
on the assumption that preventing an overburdened docket is 
omnipresent in the minds of most judges.268 But other Pearson factors 
arguably point in the opposite direction and outweigh cost 
considerations. Kelly is a textbook example of a case where “there 
 
265. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Szymecki 
v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:08-cv-00142-HCM-TEM, at 8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 
11, 2008). 
266. E.g., Martha Neil, Litigation Too Costly, E-Discovery a ‘Morass,’ Trial 
Lawyers Say, ABA J. (Sep. 9, 2008, 10:00 AM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/litigation_too_costly_e_discovery_a_morass
_trial_lawyers_say/ (noting, however, that most lawyers surveyed felt 
“the current system works well for some kinds of cases, such as individual 
tort claims”). 
267. See, e.g., Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at the 
Crossroads: Adapt or Lose!, 14 Miss. C. L. Rev. 211 (1994) (exploring 
the ever-present tradeoff between quality and quantity of cases heard by 
federal courts). 
268. See id. at 211–12. 
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would be little if any conservation of judicial resources to be had by 
beginning and ending with a discussion of the ‘clearly established’ 
prong,”269 which completely undercuts any potential cost-savings 
rationale. The Third Circuit devoted nearly five pages of its Kelly 
opinion to analyzing and distinguishing cases from within the circuit 
and other jurisdictions that had considered the First Amendment 
recording issue,270 only to ultimately decline to contribute to the 
substantive discussion and instead use the relatively in-depth analysis 
to dispose of the case because the right was not “clearly established” 
within the circuit.271 With the abundance of language indicating the 
court’s doubt that such a broad First Amendment right existed at all, 
it is questionable whether much additional analysis would have been 
required to instead hold that such a right simply did not exist, or, if it 
did, that it required the recorder to have an “expressive purpose.”272 
The outcome to the parties would have been the same, but the Third 
Circuit would have made a real contribution to a genuine circuit 
split—“promot[ing] the development of constitutional precedent”273—
instead of simply muddying the waters with lengthy and ultimately 
inconclusive discussion. 
The remaining Pearson factors also point towards deciding the 
constitutional issue. The factual basis for the plaintiff’s claims was 
well developed and fairly undisputed.274 There were no uncertain 
interpretations of state law which were material.275 There is nothing 
indicating that the parties’ briefing was inadequate.276 There were no 
 
269. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  
270. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 259–63. 
271. Id. at 263. 
272. Id. at 262. 
273. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.  
274. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251–52. 
275. Id. at 252. The official government position, as embodied by the 
assistant district attorney, was that it was appropriate for the police 
officer to arrest the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania wiretap statute. Id. 
In Kelly, any unsettled state law was significant mainly to the Fourth 
Amendment probable cause claim. See id. at 254–59. Moreover, in 
evaluating that claim, the court found the law to be “clearly 
established.” Id. at 258. 
276. To the contrary, the plaintiff in Kelly appeared to address most of the 
relevant precedent available for his position at the time of the case. See 
id. at 261 (“Kelly also cites a number of cases for the proposition that a 
general right to record matters of public concern has been clearly 
established.”). The court simply rejected their applicability. Id. at 262. 
Presumably, the government supplied the case law concerning time, 
place, and manner restrictions and the requirement that speech have an 
expressive component. See id. at 262–63. 
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certiorari petitions pending before the Supreme Court from other 
circuits confronting the issue.277 The “balancing” therefore consisted of 
an unstated burden on court resources (and potentially cost to the 
parties)—undercut by the fact that the court nonetheless devoted 
considerable discussion to the substantive constitutional issues—
trumping the other six Pearson factors. If the Kelly court’s 
consideration of the Pearson factors had been required to be on the 
record, it is doubtful it could have disposed of the case as it did 
without abusing its discretion. 
As mentioned previously,278 Szymecki presents different problems. 
The district court’s reasoning in the case is particularly confusing, as 
is its precise effect on future right-to-record litigation within the 
Fourth Circuit. The district court, in ruling on the defendant police 
officer’s motion to dismiss, apparently found that a First Amendment 
right to film police existed “subject to reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions.”279 Yet the court declined to determine definitely 
whether that right was violated by the police officer’s actions, instead 
moving on to whether the right was “clearly established.”280 This is 
especially curious, since at the time the district court decided the case 
in December 2008,281 the Pearson decision was still a month away, so 
Saucier still mandated deciding the constitutional-violation prong of 
 
277. The Court has only considered one petition for certiorari in a case 
concerning the right to record police, which came two years after Kelly. 
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 651 (2012). Although the Court’s official doctrine has long held 
that nothing concerning the merits of an issue should be implied from a 
denial of certiorari, skeptical observers have continued to puzzle over its 
practical significance. Compare Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 
U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950) (internal citations omitted) (“[Denial of 
certiorari] simply means that fewer than four members of the Court 
deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court . . . . A variety of 
considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition 
different reasons may lead different Justices to the same result. . . . [S]uch a 
denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s views 
on the merits of a case which it has declined to review.”), with Peter Linzer, 
The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1278 (1979) 
(“[Many people] take literally and seriously what Justice Harlan once said 
publicly to Learned Hand: ‘when you read in Monday morning’s New York 
Times ‘Certiorari denied’ to one of your cases, then despite the usual 
teachings, what the notation really means is ‘Judgment affirmed.’’”). 
278. See supra notes 192–99 and accompanying text.  
279. Szymecki v. Houck, No. 2:08-cv-00142-HCM-TEM, at *6 (E.D. Va. Dec. 
17, 2008), aff’d, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009). 
280. Id. at *7. 
281. Id.  
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the qualified immunity inquiry before moving on to the “clearly 
established” prong.282  
Even ignoring this separate legal error, the Szymecki district 
court’s discussion of whether the right to record was “clearly 
established” was conspicuously narrow, although probably correct 
within Fourth Circuit rules of decision. While noting that the plaintiff 
had cited two decisions from other circuits establishing a right to 
record, it reasoned, using Fourth Circuit precedent,283 that the 
existence of those cases “does not mean that . . . this specific right 
was clearly established [in the Fourth Circuit].”284 The district court 
thus (1) seemingly recognized there was a First Amendment right to 
record police in its order concerning defendant’s motion to dismiss, 
(2) declined to decide whether the police officer’s actions were a 
violation of that right, in contradiction of Saucier, and (3) ruled that 
despite persuasive decisions in other circuits, Fourth Circuit rules of 
decision prevent it from according those decisions any effect when 
deciding whether the right was “clearly established.” 
By the time the Fourth Circuit heard the Szymecki appeal, the 
Supreme Court had decided Pearson in the interim.285 The error in 
the district court’s opinion, previously reversible under Saucier, was 
no longer fatal. Rather than go through the messy business of sorting 
out the implications of the district court’s earlier order holding that a 
First Amendment right to record police existed, the Fourth Circuit 
ignored that aspect of the district court’s decision, instead simply 
affirming—with minimal reasoning—the district court’s “clearly 
established” conclusion.286 Both the district court opinion and the 
Fourth Circuit opinion were initially unpublished,287 restricting their 
precedential value in some circuits.288 With all of its confusing 
 
282. See supra notes 105–109 and accompanying text. 
283. Szymecki, No. 2:08cv-00142-HCM-TEM, at *7–8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 
2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (“While the 
nonexistence of a case holding the defendant’s identical conduct to be 
unlawful does not necessarily prevent the denial of qualified immunity, if 
a right is recognized in some other circuit, but not this one, an official 
will ordinarily retain the immunity defense. . . . Mrs. Szymecki did not 
cite any decision by the Supreme Court, any decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, any decision by any district court within 
the Fourth Circuit, or any decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia to 
support this proposition.”). 
284. Id. at *8. 
285. See supra notes 110–114. 
286. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
287. Crawford v. Geiger, No. 3:13CV1883, 2014 WL 554469, at *9 (N.D. 
Ohio Feb. 10, 2014). 
288. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure requires the circuits to at least 
allow citation to cases disposed of after January 1, 2007, but the 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
What Is and What Should Never Be 
1946 
procedural history, some courts have made the error of citing 
Szymecki as if it had created a genuine circuit split on the underlying 
constitutional issue of a First Amendment right to film police,289 
instead of simply holding that there had been no Fourth Circuit 
precedent to rely on to declare the right clearly established prior to 
the decision in the Syzmecki case itself. 
From a big picture standpoint, because the district court decided 
Szymecki before the Supreme Court decided Pearson, it is difficult to 
analyze its decision under the Pearson factors. Nevertheless, 
imagining if such a case was to be decided in the same way today, it 
would arguably represent an abuse of Pearson discretion. The 
Szymecki district court proceeded to the “clearly established” prong 
based purely on the convenience that narrow Fourth Circuit rules of 
decision would provide in limiting the factors it had to consider.290 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed on similarly narrow grounds.291 Without 
referencing any sort of balancing of the other factors that Pearson 
mandates, such a decision today would be essentially arbitrary,292 and 
thus reversible. 
The three additional factors proposed by this Comment for 
addition to the Pearson analysis, which derive from previous decisions 
of the Court, would further highlight the discretionary shortcomings 
in a case like Kelly or Szymecki that arose today. First, the executive  
particular weight attached to those citations varies among the circuits. 
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; Colter Paulsen, Case Management in the Sixth 
Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, Squire Sanders Sixth Circuit 
Appellate Blog (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog. 
com/news-and-analysis/case-management-in-the-sixth-circuit-unpublished-
opinions/. Cf. Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-
Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the 
Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 
81 Wash. L. Rev. 217 (2006) (highlighting the danger non-precedential 
decisions can have within a circuit as well). 
289. See, e.g., Williams v. Boggs, No. 6:13-65-DCR, 2014 WL 585373, at *6 
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2014) (quoting Miller v. Colson, 694 F.3d 691, 698 
(6th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[D]isagreement 
among the circuit courts is evidence that a certain matter of federal law is 
not clearly established.”). The disagreement referred to in Miller is the 
underlying constitutional right, not whether the right is clearly established. 
Miller v. Colson illustrated its circuit-split principle by referring to the 
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on a substantive issue—the scope of “an 
indigent criminal defendant’s constitutional right to psychiatric assistance 
in preparing an insanity defense.” Miller, 694 F.3d at 697–98 (citing 
Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
290. Szymecki v. Houck, No. 2:08-cv-00142-HCM-TEM, at *8 (E.D. Va. filed 
Dec. 17, 2008), aff’d, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009). 
291. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2009). 
292. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.  
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branch of the federal government has quite clearly elucidated its take 
on the constitutionality of laws that unnecessarily restrict the First 
Amendment right to record police. In 2012, the Department of Justice 
issued a memo to the Baltimore Police Department that resoundingly 
encouraged police acknowledgement and protection of such a right 
through carefully crafted department-level policies, stating that it 
“reflects the United States’ position on the basic elements of a 
constitutionally adequate policy on individuals’ right to record police 
activity.”293 Second, in comparison to the two circuits that recognized 
a right to record police when Kelly and Szymecki were decided, today 
four circuits have affirmatively ruled that such a right exists,294 with a 
fifth circuit possible in the near future.295 As more courts around the 
nation encounter the issue of a First Amendment right to record 
police, it will become increasingly difficult to justify the decision to 
abstain from that dialogue on the grounds of Pearson discretion. 
Third, and finally, alternative causes of action would likely present 
different legal difficulties that prevented them from being effective 
vehicles for constitutional development.296  
As demonstrated, the decisions by the courts in Kelly and 
Szymecki to proceed with the “clearly established” prong of the 
qualified-immunity inquiry arguably do not accord with the relevant 
considerations elaborated in Pearson. Requiring district courts to 
place their Pearson balancing on the record would hasten the 
development of constitutional law on important issues like the First 
Amendment right to record police by making it harder for district 
courts to simply brush aside the need to make difficult decisions at 
the risk of being reversed. Further, requiring district courts to 
consider whether coordinate branches of government or courts in 
other circuits have taken stances on a particular issue would help 
them to separate novel questions of law that have national, systemic 
 
293. Letter from Jonathan M. Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Sec., Civil Rights 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark H. Grimes, Office of Legal Affairs, 
Balt. Police Dep’t (May 14, 2012) (explaining the legal basis for the 
right to record, prohibited police responses to being filmed, narrow 
circumstances constituting citizen interference with police duties, 
adequate supervisory review policies, and search and seizure guidelines). 
294. See supra Part II.C.1. 
295. Recent decisions by two district courts in Ohio and Kentucky reached 
different results on the right to record police, shifting the spotlight to 
the Sixth Circuit. Compare Crawford v. Geiger, No. 3:13CV1883, 2014 
WL 554469, at *8–10 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014) (holding the First 
Amendment right to record police exists and was clearly established), 
with Williams v. Boggs, No. 6:13-65-DCR, 2014 WL 585373, at *7 (E.D. 
Ky. Feb. 13, 2014) (holding that there is not a clearly established First 
Amendment right to record police). 
296. See supra notes 201–209 and accompanying text. 
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importance from less plausible or more idiosyncratic claims. Such a 
compromise in qualified immunity doctrine would afford district 
courts the flexible discretion that the Court sought to grant them in 
Pearson while still prohibiting them from behaving arbitrarily in 
avoiding underlying constitutional questions. Rather than a 
mandatory return to Saucier’s “rigid order of battle,” the Court 
should encourage a middle ground: a reasoned order of battle. 
B. About Those Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions . . . 
As several of the leading cases mention, and consistent with other 
First Amendment rights, presumably the right to film will be subject 
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.297 As discussed in 
Part II.A, laws in the ilk of wiretapping statutes likely fail as valid 
restrictions, even under intermediate scrutiny. With a couple of 
notable exceptions, however, the cases have been rather silent on 
precisely what other types of laws permissible restrictions would likely 
encompass. On the one hand, this should hardly be surprising as a 
matter of judicial restraint. Courts, having no opportunity to decide 
such matters until a concrete controversy arises,298 must wait until 
plaintiffs bring them challenges to allegedly invalid restrictions and 
government defendants invoke a time, place, and manner defense.299 
But it is becoming increasingly clear that once the dust settles on 
whether there is a First Amendment right to record police to begin 
with, time, place, and manner restrictions represent the next frontier 
for litigation.300 Therefore, this Comment will offer a few brief 
thoughts on the potential limits of such restrictions. The purpose of 
this section is to provide a rough outline, rather than a comprehensive 
analysis, of how First and Fourth Amendment doctrines will interact 
in this setting, because this is likely where the majority of foreseeable 
time, place, and manner restriction justifications will derive in a right-
to-record-police setting.301 
 
297. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Szymecki v. Houck, Civil No. 2:08-cv-00142-HCM-TEM, at *8 (E.D. Va. 
filed Dec. 17, 2008), aff’d, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009); Kelly v. 
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); Glik v. Cunniffe, 
655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 
605–08 (7th Cir. 2012). 
298. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1. 
299. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) 
(considering whether a restriction on the sound system in a rock concert 
was reasonable with regard to time, place and the manner of the 
restriction). 
300. See supra note 297. 
301. Judge Posner’s dissent in Alvarez is an effective summary of 
justifications offered by those who oppose a First Amendment right to 
film police on the merits. It emphasizes “public safety” and “effective 
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There are three readily foreseeable situations where a citizen could 
be recording a police officer’s actions, and each has potentially 
different ramifications. The first scenario is where the citizen doing 
the filming is the subject of police investigation for some crime or 
violation.302 In this case, presumably the citizen recorder’s rights 
would be at their lowest ebb due to the overriding concerns for police 
officer safety.303 Keeping objects that could be potential weapons out 
of the citizen’s hands would be a paramount concern.304 Hands-free 
filming, such as that done by a camera mounted to a dashboard,305 a 
piece of clothing,306 or inside a motorcycle helmet,307 presumably would 
not carry a similar level of risk, and thus restricting its use would 
presumably not be sufficiently narrowly tailored to the goal of 
achieving police safety. While police would probably not be allowed to 
 
law enforcement” rationales, while exhibiting a conception of privacy 
very different from Katz. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 611–14 (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
302. See, e.g., Maryland v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. 
LEXIS 7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2010). Anthony Graber was a National 
Guard staff sergeant who was pulled over on his motorcycle for driving 
recklessly on the highway. When the officer drew his gun on Graber 
before writing him a ticket, Graber posted a video of the encounter to 
YouTube, which he had recorded using a helmet camera. A month later, 
police officer raided Graber’s parents’ home, where he lived, and 
arrested him for violation of Maryland wiretap laws after seizing his 
recording equipment. Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for 
Videotaping the Police, ABC News (July 19, 2010), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=11179076. 
303. See, e.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1998) (allowing police 
to order a suspect to remain in or step out of a vehicle during a traffic 
stop to preserve officer safety); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) 
(allowing police to perform an open-handed pat down of the exterior of 
a suspect’s clothing if they possess a reasonable suspicion the suspect 
may be armed); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) 
(allowing police to detain persons leaving a home that they have a 
warrant to search); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) 
(allowing police to perform a full search of a suspect’s person incident to 
arrest). 
304. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 231 (citing Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482, 484 
(1867) (internal citation omitted)). 
305. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
306. Cf. Ian Lovett, In California, a Champion for Police Cameras, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 22, 2013, at A12 (“In the first year after the cameras were 
introduced [in Rialto, California] in February 2012, the number of 
complaints filed against officers fell by 88 percent compared with the 
previous 12 months. Use of force by officers fell by almost 60 percent 
over the same period.”). 
307. See supra note 302. 
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halt such recording, there would probably be a compelling argument 
in some cases for the need to seize such footage as evidence.308 
The second scenario would involve a citizen who has an interest 
in or relationship to another citizen who is being investigated for 
commission of a crime or violation, but who is not himself or herself a 
subject of investigation.309 For example, the citizen may be a 
passenger in a car pulled over for a traffic violation, or a co-resident 
of a shared dwelling being searched. In such cases the same officer 
safety rationales would probably apply until it was determined that 
the citizen was not the subject of any official investigation. At that 
point, if the citizen began recording the encounter from a comfortable 
remove, there would appear to be a less compelling argument for any 
additional restrictions by officers.310 The same evidence rationales as 
in the first scenario may still apply to collecting the resultant footage 
and audio, though.311 
The third scenario would involve a citizen who is a disinterested 
third-party bystander in a public place.312 Here, the citizen’s First 
Amendment right to record the police officers’ actions would 
presumably be at its apex. As the First Circuit noted in Glik, 
recording police officer activity from a reasonable distance while not 
interrupting the exercise of their duties is “not reasonably subject to 
limitation.”313 It is important to note that verbally protesting what 
officers are doing while filming them is probably insufficient to be 
considered interference, as that itself would be protected speech.314  
 
308. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely 
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence 
on the arrestee’s person [or in the area within his immediate control] in 
order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”). 
309. E.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). 
310. Cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(referring to the “charade of officer safety” that the government offered 
to justify the search of a suspect’s entire vehicle incident to arrest after 
the suspect was already in custody in the back of a police car). 
311. See supra note 308. 
312. E.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2011). 
313. Id. at 84. 
314. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he freedom of 
individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby 
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we 
distinguish a free nation from a police state. The same restraint 
demanded of law enforcement officers in the face of provocative and 
challenging speech must be expected when they are merely the subject 
of videotaping . . . .”). See also Letter, supra note 293 (“Nor does an 
individual’s conduct amount to interference if he or she expresses 
criticism of the police or the police activity being observed.”). 
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Privacy interests asserted by officers in any of the three scenarios 
should be similarly unavailing as time, place, and manner restrictions. 
This is true under either—and often both—of two theories. First, as 
the Seventh Circuit noted in Alvarez, the Katz rationale that what 
one exposes to the public is not private will carry the day in many 
police-recording situations.315 Second, in other conceivable situations—
such as an arrest inside a building, for example—the idea that the 
public duties of public officials are de facto not private should 
govern.316 Regardless of the precise theory, the allowable range of 
restrictions will likely be quite narrow.317 
C. The Need for Statutory Damage Provisions with Teeth 
In order to recover more than nominal damages in a § 1983 
action, Carey v. Piphus318 holds that the plaintiff must be able to 
allege injuries apart from the violation of a constitutional right 
itself.319 The § 1983 requirement of a cognizable injury will be thorny 
in the context of citizen recorders. Absent damage to or confiscation 
of the citizen’s recording device, the only injury will be the lost 
opportunity to film the now-past encounter. This likely comes fatally 
close to being an injury solely to the exercise of the constitutional 
right, which is unrecoverable because “damages based on the ‘value’ 
or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not authorized.”320 While a 
request for punitive damages may also be an option, the plaintiff 
would have to prove the additional element of the offending officer’s 
 
315. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2012). 
316. Wasserman, supra note 27, at 650. 
317. The Alvarez court noted that in addition to being closely tailored, any 
reasonable restriction might have to leave open adequate alternative 
channels of gathering information. “[A]udiovisual recording [sic] are 
uniquely reliable . . . . Their self-authenticating character makes it 
highly unlikely that other methods could be considered reasonably 
adequate substitutes.” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. Contra Kelly v. 
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation 
omitted) (“[W]e held that the planning committee’s prohibition on 
videotaping was not unconstitutional because other means of recording 
the meeting—for example, note-taking—were permitted, thus protecting 
the public’s right of access.”). 
318. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
319. Id. at 266. 
320. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 n.13 (1986). 
See also Murphy, supra note 6, at 349. This is often a problem with the 
denial of constitutional rights. A more conservative view of constitutional 
development might emphasize that eventually some plaintiffs will come 
forward with actual compensatory damages that make it sufficiently 
worthwhile to bring suit, and that those plaintiffs will be the ones to 
establish “clearly established” law. 
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“evil motive or intent” or “reckless or callous indifference to the 
federally protected rights of others.”321 
Accordingly, one commentator, operating on the premise that 
successful deterrence requires a remedy that simultaneously 
compensates the victim and punishes the violating officer,322 has 
proposed a model state statute that includes a mandatory punitive 
damages provision.323 Such standalone statutes, including the one 
proposed by Connecticut Senate in 2012,324 are certainly laudable and 
represent one way to force officers to internalize the consequences of 
their First Amendment violations. Because the federal damages 
regime is relatively settled,325 state legislatures should take the 
opportunity to enact the respective regimes that they feel best 
balance rectifying First Amendment recording violations with other 
considerations.326 
It is worth noting that a broad range of punishments could 
effectively vindicate a citizen recorder’s violated rights. The point of 
such provisions is to make them sting enough to discourage future 
violations; how much sting is appropriate is open for debate. For 
example, such a spectrum could range from mandating administrative 
punishments, such as suspensions without pay,327 on the one end, to 
amending state provisions equivalent to § 1983 to mandate the award 
of attorney’s fees,328 or statutorily allowing punitive damages at the  
321. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
322. Murphy, supra note 6, at 353. 
323. Id. at 354–55. 
324. Id. at 355 (referencing S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 
2012). See Hugh McQuaid, Senate Passes Watered-Down Police 
Recording Bill, New Haven Independent (June 3, 2011, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/senate
_passes_watered-down_police_recording_bill/ (exploring the origins of 
and debate surrounding the new law). 
325. See supra notes 318–320 and accompanying text. 
326. For example, the cost of spurious litigation. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 
(“Unfortunately, there have also been a growing number of frivolous 
lawsuits, particularly actions for damages against law enforcement 
officers . . . .”). 
327. See Police Discipline and Community Policing: New Models, Cmty. 
Policing Dispatch (Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs. (COPS), U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice), (Aug. 2008), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch 
/August_2008/new_model.htm (explaining community-service 
alternatives to traditional police discipline that may better develop 
public trust of police officers). 
328. Technically, judges may currently award attorney’s fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs, although such awards are highly unlikely for those who only 
recover nominal damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); Farrar v. Hobby, 
506 U.S. 103, 114–16 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks 
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jury’s discretion, on the other end. As long as some sort of substantial 
punitive action flows from the constitutional violation itself, states 
should get creative in formulating the solution that best fits  
their needs. 
Conclusion 
American attitudes towards the use of police force are complex. 
We praise it when it protects us,329 sometimes laugh at it in the 
abstract,330 and lament it when it goes a step too far.331 The way we 
 
omitted) (“[T]he most critical factor in determining the reasonableness 
of a fee award is the degree of success obtained. . . . This litigation 
accomplished little beyond giving petitioners the moral satisfaction of 
knowing that a federal court concluded that their rights had been violated . 
. . . In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally prevails under § 
1988 should receive no attorney’s fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks 
compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often 
such a prevailing party.”). Making the award of attorney’s fees 
mandatory as a matter of state law would often be quite a significant 
punishment. See Goetz v. Ricketts, 632 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D. Colo. 
1986) (awarding a prevailing plaintiff in a civil-rights suit $42,318 in 
attorney fees). This accords with the average costs of litigation in other 
types of suits. See Paul Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, 
Court Statistics Project, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 
Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation 6–7 (reporting that the 
average cost of an automobile tort case was around $43,000, compared 
to $54,000 for premises liability cases, $88,000 for employment cases, 
$91,000 for contract cases, and a whopping $122,000 for malpractice 
cases). 
329. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye et al., 2nd Bombing Suspect Is Captured, 
Wounded, After a Frenzied Manhunt Paralyzes Boston: Overnight 
Shooting Amid Dragnet Left Brother and Officer Dead, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 20, 2013, at A1 (detailing the prolonged, gunshot-filled manhunt 
for Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev). 
330. See, e.g., Robin Hood: Men in Tights 00:13:12 (Twentieth Century 
Fox 1993) (As Prince John’s soldiers are beating Ahchoo, played by 
Dave Chappelle, he exclaims, “Man, I hope someone’s getting a video of 
this thing!”). See also Kris Coronado, Whatever Happened to . . . The 
Guy Who Got Tased by Police at a Kerry Forum?, Wash. Post, May 
22, 2011(Magazine), at 6 (“[A University of Florida student who was 
tased by police] trademarked the phrase “Don’t tase me, bro’’ in September 
2007 and says he has sold quite a few T-shirts on his Web site.”). 
331. See, e.g., Ben Brumfield & Melanie Whitley, Oklahoma Father Dies in 
Police Encounter After Mother Slaps Daughter, CNN Justice (Feb. 26, 
2014, 8:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/justice/oklahoma-
arrest-death-video/ (“It was supposed to be a fun family outing to the 
movies, but Nair Rodriguez’s 19-year-old daughter got under her skin. 
They fought, she said, and she slapped her daughter. Moments later, 
police arrived on a domestic dispute call at the Moore, Oklahoma, 
theater and did not confront Nair Rodriguez but rather her husband, 
Luis. They took him down, and after the encounter on February 15, he 
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feel about it is often if not always dependent on the context of its 
application. Video and audio recordings memorialize this context with 
an unmatched level of accuracy, allowing us to rapidly—and 
sometimes viscerally332—grasp the gist and propriety of a depicted 
police interaction. In many instances, video footage will be the next 
best thing to having been on the scene. Recordings are thus important 
tools in evaluating how police officers are serving us as public 
servants, and the right to make them should find its refuge in the 
First Amendment. 
No federal circuit has disagreed with this proposition. Yet 
unanimous judicial recognition of the right to record police has proven 
elusive. Somehow, despite consideration by six Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, the right to record remains in limbo. Two circuits declined to 
definitively answer the issue, and in doing so exercised an 
unrestrained brand of discretion that ignored the relevant factors 
discussed by the Court in Pearson v. Callahan. What remains is an 
artificial split—not on the merits of the First Amendment right 
violated, but on technical qualified immunity grounds. It is a split 
that should never have arisen. In future qualified immunity cases, the 
Court should require district courts to make well-reasoned Pearson 
findings on the record, and take the opportunity to ensure the kind of 
“sound” discretion that does not stagnate judicial recognition of 
important individual rights. 
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was dead.”); Michael Schwirtz & J. David Goodman, Police Bullets Hit 
Bystanders, and Questions Rise Yet Again, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2013, 
at A1 (recounting an incident where two police officers accidentally shot 
two bystanders while trying to apprehend a mentally ill man in Times 
Square). 
332. Shaw, supra note 3, at 171–72 (internal citations omitted) (“A thirty 
minute video emerged in 2011 showing the killing of Kelly Thomas, a 
homeless and mentally ill man suspected of breaking into cars. In the 
truly disturbing video, six officers threaten and then beat Thomas with 
fists, a baton, and the butt of a stun gun while he repeatedly apologizes, 
insists that he cannot breathe, and pleads for his absent father. Thomas 
subsequently died of a crushed windpipe. Spectators at trial left the 
courtroom in disgust and the judge paused the video to warn those who 
could not stomach its content to leave.”). 
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